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April 4, 1956

A WEEKLY JOURNAL OF OPINION

The Bricker Amendment: Its Background and Meaning

JAMES BURNHAM

Britain Caught in Cyprus

F. A. VOIGT

The Plight of Business Forecasting

LUDWIG VON MISES

Articles and Reviews by · · · · GEN. CHARLES A. WILLOUGHBY
RUSSELL KIRK · E. v. KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN · SAM M. JONES
BEN RAY REDMAN · WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM · FRANK S. MEYER

from WASHINGTON *straight*

A NEWSLETTER

SAM M. JONES

Minnesota Aftermath

Senator Kefauver's smashing victory in Minnesota wrought significant changes in Democratic prospects, all of them ominous. Overnight the front-running Stevenson, choice of most of the party bosses, became underdog. The powerful Humphrey-Freeman machine broke down, leaving the red-faced Senator and Governor fumbling for an alibi. Averell Harriman shifted his campaign drive from inactive to active. The outlook for a split in the Party with a third ticket in the South increased. Democratic leaders began a desperate survey of possible compromise candidates (Stuart Symington, Lyndon Johnson, Frank Lausche, even Harry Truman). Republican leaders, confident of an Eisenhower victory before the Minnesota primary, warned against complacency but could not conceal an overweening optimism.

White House Invites Conflict

There is a powerful bi-partisan congressional opposition to grand-scale foreign assistance, but the President made no modification in his request for $4,859,975,000 for foreign military and economic aid. The measure therefore becomes a test of strength between Congress and the White House. More controversial than the multi-billion dollar program itself is the accompanying demand for congressional commitment to a continuance of foreign aid for at least ten years and for greater Executive powers in spending the money. With the exception of the Eisenhower wing of the GOP, the program has little enthusiastic support. Minority leader Knowland is especially critical of the long-term aid feature. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Walter George, favors a cut and opposes long-range promises. The present outlook is for a drastic slash and no hangover commitments.

Republican Conference

The nature and extent of President Eisenhower's campaigning may be decided at the nation-wide conference of the GOP leaders to be held in Washington April 16 and 17. By the way, preferences concerning the Vice-Presidential candidacy have been indicated by an AP poll of prominent Republicans, many of whom will attend the conference: Nixon led 13 to 1.

Air-Power Probe

Sensational charges of U. S. inadequacy in air power, made by a few members of Congress and some news columnists, will be examined early in April, when a subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee headed by Stuart Symington begins its hearings. The subcommittee includes Democratic Senators Jackson and Ervin, and Republicans Saltonstall and Duff. Jackson, like Symington, has assailed the Administration for alleged deficiencies in air strength. Responsibility for getting the Administration's case in the record will rest largely on Duff, who, unlike Saltonstall, has no aversion to controversy.

Distinguished Lobbyists

Sixty-six one-time members of Congress are among the 4,216 individuals who (according to Congressional Quarterly) have registered as lobbyists since the enactment in 1946 of the law requiring registration. Several of the ex-legislators have found other work after signing the lobby record. Former Senate Majority Leader Ernest W. McFarland, of Arizona, turned to lobbying after his defeat in 1952, but gave up this business to become Governor of his native state. Senator Joseph C. O'Mahoney of Wyoming turned to lobbying in the interim between his Senate defeat and reelection. Federal Judge John A. Danaher was a registered lobbyist prior to his judicial appointment. Two former Representatives are heads of major lobbies: Jerry Voorhis (D-Calif.) has been executive director of the Cooperative League of the U.S.A. since his defeat by Richard M. Nixon in '46; and Clyde D. Ellis (D-Ark.) has been general manager of National Rural Electric Cooperative since '47.

New Slogan

The Republican National Committee has adopted a new slogan, "Stick with Ike" to replace the "I Like Ike" of '52. Samples are now in the mail to 10,000 state and local Republican organizations. "Stick with Ike" is printed on wall and car stickers and on match folders with an adhesive surface. (Administration critics here spoof that the GOP Committee has used the right verb in the wrong tense.)

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The WEEK

Stevenson is not through, but he is slowed down to a crawl, and he may never run again. Many theories are being advanced to explain the upset. Kefauver's popularity doesn't appear to have been the only responsible factor. There was abroad in Minnesota a positive anti-Stevensonism which affected a crucial number of voters. How explain it? (Raymond Moley comments, "Did you ever try to tell a joke in Minnesota?") It is perhaps a revolt against a managed candidate; against the cabal that dominates Stevenson. It may, however, be even more: it may be the triumph of mediocrity. Whatever his faults, Stevenson is an unusual and talented man. Kefauver is a flat, colorless demagogue—and the people's choice.

We noted last week that a Popular Front government was projected in Indonesia, to be formed by a coalition of the Nationalist, Orthodox Teachers and Communist parties. In this development the initiative has been taken by President Sukarno. However, the intended Premier, Ali Sastroamidjojo, together with influential factions of the two non-Communist parties, has been holding out against Sukarno. They have proposed a Cabinet in which the Communists would be replaced by the pro-Western Masjumi Party. It is encouraging that active forces in Indonesia are aware of the danger of an alliance with Communists. Sukarno continues to insist on bringing the Communists into the government. The outcome, as we go to press, is not yet decided. It becomes more difficult than ever to explain why Mr. Dulles invited Mr. Sukarno to visit Washington.

In the way of endorsing a clear statement: "On March 3rd, the Kremlin-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions, which we of world free labor consider the most dangerous spearhead of the international Communist conspiracy, announced that Tito's so-called unions had been reaffiliated with it. This is most significant. It shows far more clearly where Tito is going than any pact he signs with Turkey and Greece or any promise he gives to Washington. Our overseas colleagues who had illusions about Tito's unions being free and different from Moscow's Communist labor fronts should now awaken to reality. I submit that the time has come for our State Department to re-examine thoroughly the entire problem of further American aid to the Tito regime."—

George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO, at Long Island University, March 6, 1956.

An item that appeared recently in the London *Times* seems relevant in an age when it is widely assumed that segregation is a uniquely American phenomenon: "The senior nursing staff at Storthes Hall Hospital, near Huddersfield, a mental hospital with more than 2,500 patients, are opposed to a proposal to employ colored nurses there . . . Mr. Sutcliffe, who is the nurse tutor of the hospital, said their objections had nothing to do with a color bar. 'These people,' he said, 'are going to be asked to interpret as "normal" and "abnormal" slight gradations of behavior which can only be viewed against existing culture.' Other meetings, representing lower grades of employees at the hospital, have resolved that they will consider working with colored nurses 'only when conditions in the nursing service are improved sufficiently to attract the white population.' "

The props have been knocked from under the most *estremanente* dedicated of Italian Communists, which is something that never happened to his arch-adversary, the Italian Catholic. Say what you will of the Catholic Church, say that it is reactionary and capitalist-ridden, that money in the poor-box never reaches the poor, that Pope Alexander VI was the rule rather than the exception; still, for the Vatican, once a saint, always a saint. A parent feels a certain security when he christens his son Giuseppe or Francesco or Antonio and his daughter Maria or Theresa or Catarina. But one-hundred-and-eighty-seven sets of Italian Communist parents are now stuck with sons named Stalin, and what to do about it they simply don't know. The wise parent of the future, resigned to the fact that historical determinism does not fill in the details, will name his son Marx-Lenin-Trotsky-Stalin-Malenkov-Bulganin-Khrushchev-Togliatti, or Pepe, for short.

Louis Bromfield, whose untimely death we lament, was a man of such ebullient creative energy that he was able to achieve fame in two distinct fields, literature and agriculture. That is remarkable enough; but even more remarkable, it seems to us, is the fact that in the political activity for which he also found time he was always, absolutely and uncompromisingly, his own man. He followed his own convictions, and if they sometimes led him astray it could still be said of him, as Jefferson said of Washington, that he erred with integrity. In this age of "the treason of the intellectuals," that is praise indeed.

This time, for sure, the predatory state has gone too far. The elders of Memphis, Tennessee, have imposed upon its citizens a law so alien to those impulses which raise man above the beasts, so insensible to all finer instincts, that it will surely unite in opposition to it the NAACP and the White Citizens Councils, the ADA and the DAR, the Seventh Day Adventists and the Knights of Columbus. . . . The law makes it illegal for a motorist to warn another motorist that he is approaching a radar speed-trap. We recommend that it be resisted by armed violence.

A Splendid Victory

After 156 days, James B. Carey and his union aides have allowed the 45,000 striking Westinghouse electrical workers to return to the job. The men walked out one bright day last October on what they hoped would be a "quickie" strike. They manned the picket lines right through the winter to the first day of spring. On March 21, union and management leaders finally agreed on terms. Management preserved its much contended right to manage. But, of course, the union claimed the match.

Like Bleinheim, Carey said in effect, "T'was a splendid victory." The strike cost the workers $90 million in back pay. It will be many a year before they get that back in wage increases. Westinghouse lost $250 million to $290 million in orders. Management officials took a 50 per cent cut in salary. But James B. Carey, who fought the strike to its bitter finish to bolster his slipping prestige as a union leader, took no salary cut, nor did, it appears, his minions.

The total cost of the strike was nearly $400 million, a heavy price to pay for the prestige even of a James B. Carey. But then, as some of the workers sang (sotto voce, to be sure) while on picket duty to the tune of "16 Tons":

When the leaders call a strike, step outside
Lotta men didn't and a lotta men died...
You're always in the middle when you're just plain Bill
If the company don't get you, then the union will.
Like my job in the plant, but I can't go
Cause the law makes me stick with the CIO.

Foreign Aid for What?

For the tenth consecutive year, a President of the U.S. has requested Congress to vote a large sum of money for a program of peacetime "foreign aid." Eisenhower has asked for $4,859,975,000 (a kind of Macy-principle price-cut, no doubt). The request was accompanied by a message that made much use of words like "necessary," "fundamental," "urgent."

There is a doctor of our acquaintance who the other night was discussing with us a sick lady on whom he had just paid a professional call. "I gave her that new wonder drug," he confessed somewhat wryly. "You know—you give the patient the drug and then wonder what will happen." Our foreign-aid specialists remind us of this doctor, though they are not so frank in self-appraisal. Here are the patients, they say—the sick nations of the free world. Let us dose them up with that new international wonder drug—foreign aid. And then? Well, then we will see what happens.

One way to find out what will probably happen in the future is to look at what has actually happened in the past. And here Mr. Eisenhower's message makes a startling and perhaps unintended revelation. Along the line, he asserts that "the past Mutual Security programs have achieved a real measure of success." But in his very first paragraph he says: "Today [foreign aid] remains as indispensable to the security of every American citizen and to the building of an enduring peace as on the day it began nine years ago." If this is so, there is only one possible conclusion that can logically be drawn: the net result of the foreign-aid program to date is exactly zero.

The President tells us that we need a foreign-aid program because "there are still nations that are eager to strive with us for peace and freedom." But nowhere, from the record or by specific illustration, does he show us how the "foreign aid" he has in mind will actually serve the goal of peace with freedom; how it will lead nations to build up military power on which we can actually rely.

These are no carping queries. Can we really rely on the military help of Italy, with its 40 per cent pro-Communist vote; or of France, whose government remains in office only by Communist sufferance? Does Tito, to whom we have given more than a billion (a fantastic total for so small a country as Yugoslavia) in practice strive with us for peace and freedom? His telegram of greetings to the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party hardly suggests so.

On March 18, the *New York Times Magazine* (a source which could scarcely be accused of a bias *against* foreign aid) published an extraordinary account by Peggy and Pierre Streit of our foreign aid in Afghanistan. The major project (the largest in Asia) was the development of the Helmand River Valley, to which, through the Export-Import Bank, we have contributed $40,000,000. The results are close to catastrophic. The project overlooked the nature of the country, its educational level, its technical resources, its customs. Much of the irrigated land has been ruined instead of reclaimed. The Afghan Government has nearly bankrupted itself paying its agreed share. The nomads and tribesmen induced to settle on the "new lands" have been impoverished and embittered. The authors describe the "Afghan fears and disillusionment over the outcome."

Since 1952 the Stassen-initiated International Cooperation Administration has also been spending money in Afghanistan, and has added to the chaos. "I.C.A.'s work in Afghanistan has been spread so thin that results are and will be negligible . . . What direct assistance I.C.A. has provided . . . is also vigorously criticized, and by its own employees, on the grounds of inefficiency, mismanagement of personnel and general program disorganization."

We live in a time of unusual peril, when the needs of the free world and of our own security demand measures of economic and military aid to other nations which (in terms both of national interest and national principle) we would normally be reluctant to consider. Even so, it does not follow that just *any* foreign aid, anywhere, for anything, is justified by abstract appeal to "urgency."

We believe that Congress should take nothing for granted. In place of homilies on the parlous state of the world, Congress should insist on an objective appraisal of past foreign aid, and on *specific* answers to *specific* questions concerning proposed future projects.

The Will to be Deceived

William James may have been right when he insisted that there are no limits to man's will to believe—which so often translates into the will to deceive oneself. We are now being told by everyone, from George Kennan to the editor of the *Daily Worker*, that we ought all to be relieved at world Communism's sudden "Anti-Stalin" campaign. This, apparently, is the "mellowing" of the Soviet regime which Mr. Kennan has so aften prophesied.

How odd the reasoning! Stalin is dead. The friends and accomplices of Stalin, trained in the same school, sharers in the same deeds, now find it expedient to denounce their dead companion, while they pursue,

as hotly as ever, by essentially the same methods, the identical goals to which they, like Stalin, are wholly dedicated.

Next week Mr. Burnham, in his column, will attempt some analysis of this macabre turn; and we expect to receive a full-length study from Boris Souvarine, Stalin's most notable biographer, as soon as he has obtained the full documentation of the recent Party Congress. Meanwhile we rest with three observations:

1. The scale of this posthumous assassination of Stalin indicates that the Communist hierarchy is in trouble. But by the customary Bolshevik technique they are trying to convert a trouble into an advantage. In this case, they are using Anti-Stalinism as a come-on to non-Communists. "See?" they say, "Stalin was the cause of all horrors and all difficulties. We are repudiating him, and this proves us to be decent folk with whom you can do business."

2. The campaign is only incidentally concerned with Stalin. Its real meaning is to serve as a cover for a continuing struggle for power among factions of the present leadership. It is quite possible that this struggle will break out into purges and terror—exactly in the Stalinist mode.

3. As usual, our government, confronted with a potential intra-Soviet crisis which could be exploited to immense advantage, has no policy and does nothing.

A Doubtful Combination

A resolution for a constitutional amendment to change the method of electing a President has now been introduced into the Senate, and it is sponsored by no fewer than fifty-one of the ninety-six senators. With this formidable backing, it is clear that the issue has shifted from theoretical discussion to practical politics.

This resolution is a combination of the Daniel (proportional vote) and Mundt (local district) proposals that were discussed by Lucius Wilmerding (NATIONAL REVIEW, March 7), and commented on in our last issue. Each state would be permitted to choose which of the two methods it preferred for the selection of its Presidential electors. Under either system, the electors of each state would no longer be named *en bloc*, as at present, but roughly in accordance with the popular vote.

The only reported reason for combining the two methods in this way is to improve the chance of getting the necessary two-thirds vote in Congress.

We have doubts about the wisdom of the compromise. We incline toward the states as against the central government where the respective rights and powers are at issue. But leaving the choice of electoral method to the states in the manner of this compromise resolution does not seem to be either an effective or an appropriate expression of States Rights. The states were given some role in choosing the President through the device of an electoral college and its subdivision by states; and the electoral college is to be retained under all proposals (except that of Senators Humphrey and Douglas for a national plebiscite). But in general, the office of the President is, and was intended by the Fathers to be, the expression of the national as against the federal aspect of our dual government.

Maryland Errs

Maryland has just passed a law that reads more like a spiteful venture in xenophobia than the fruit of responsible deliberation by one of the oldest and proudest American states. Its provisions bar from operation in Maryland any company that is less than 51 per cent owned by United States citizens.

What precipitated the law was the announced intention of the Carling Brewing Company of Canada to build a $12,000,000 brewery in Maryland. The local breweries put enough heat on the legislature to shove through this foolish affront on sound economics, sound politics, good manners.

The United States is a creditor nation, with reserves of capital seeking profitable outlets. It is a capitalist nation, with an essential interest in the free flow of money and goods, in the least possible governmental interference with production, distribution and consumption. Canada is our largest customer, and in Canada $9 billion of private United States capital—including not a little capital of Maryland citizens—is invested. Maryland labor, and Maryland industry, are now deprived of the fruits of $12,000,000 of Canadian money.

If the Maryland brewers want to lick the Carling Brewing Company, let them stand up like men, and make a better beer!

Farmers Like Farms

Anyone who gets too discouraged over our own farm problem can always get a lift by taking a look at Moscow's. Having too much food—which is after all our difficulty—is a lot pleasanter than having too little.

This month, for the tenth or twentieth time, the Soviet authorities have announced a "far-reaching" revision of the collective farm system. The crux of the new plan is the attempt at the virtual elimination of "private plots."

In theory, nearly all of Soviet agriculture is organ-

ized in large collective farms which produce a basic quota under requisition for the government, and then sell at low government-controlled prices any surplus above that quota. In practice most collective farm families have also a small "private plot" of an acre or so, on which they raise vegetables and poultry, and one way or another manage to keep a cow and a few hogs or goats. Part of the product of these private plots helps feed the individual families. The rest goes to the black—that is, the free—market, and permits some farm families to raise themselves a small degree above the miserable subsistence level to which the collective farm system condemns all but the party élite. No one who has a minimum acquaintance with human nature can be surprised at the fact that, in spite of both law and police terror, these private plots have consistently been the best cared for and most productive Soviet acres.

And this fact is a maddening thorn in the flesh of the Communist rulers. These private plots—without which the Soviet Union would incidentally have starved to death—are the nucleus of private property in the land. The farmers who till them are the embryo of a propertied class. They are ideologically anathema, a symptom of the failure of Communism to assimilate the peasantry into a fully regimented society, and a continuous potential threat against the stability of the regime.

So now, once again, under the pretense of a plan "to increase agricultural production," the Soviet regime charts a campaign to reduce and eventually liquidate these Antaeus-like private plots that spring ever renewed from the marriage of human nature and Mother Earth.

Voices of Sanity

Two men, both distinguished in their fields, have registered their opinion that involved in the controversy over the Supreme Court decision is not simply whether one believes in segregation. William Faulkner, Nobel Prize novelist, wrote in the *Reporter* that he is *against* segregated schooling; but he is convinced that the issue is political, not racial, and involves inalienable rights of the member-states. So he declares himself one with those who intend to resist the order of the Court. (If necessary, he said, he would "fight for Mississippi against the United States even if it meant going out into the streets and shooting Negroes"—a piece of melodrama of the kind one might expect from the author of *The Tall Men*).

In Princeton, a professor who holds the chair of jurisprudence once held by Woodrow Wilson made a few guarded criticisms of the Supreme Court's decision, and emphasized that "the issue isn't black and white." Professor Alpheus T. Mason criticized the argument on the basis of which the Supreme Court ruled against segregated schooling ("the Court invoked two of the flimsiest of all our disciplines—sociology and psychology—as the basis of its decision"). He does, however, believe that, for reasons *not* given—whether because the Court didn't think of them, or because it didn't consider them relevant is not clear—segregated schooling is unconstitutional.

Mr. Faulkner and Mr. Mason, in that they agree the issue is subtle, help bring it into proper focus. Those who refuse to pitch the question except in polar moral terms, will write off Mr. Faulkner as an eccentric, and Mr. Mason as an irrelevant sorehead exasperated because his own reasoning, rather than that of Gunnar Myrdal, was relied upon by the Court. Whatever the attempt to dismiss them, their voices count: for theirs, in respect of their dogged insistence that other things than Jim Crow are at stake, are the voices of sanity.

The Vital Center Rebuked

A hundred-word editorial in the Harvard *Crimson* reflects on the move by the National Chapter of Americans for Democratic Action to force its affiliate at Swarthmore College to rescind an invitation to hear Alger Hiss. The action of the ADA, says the *Crimson,* is "inquisitorial," "self-righteous," "authoritarian," "an attempt to raise a façade of political respectability," "disturbing," an act of "Draconian vigilance," "hypocritical" and "foolish"—rather a lot for a single act to be, even if committed by the ADA.

We are interested that the editorial should have started, "Ever-rabid in its denunciation of Senator McCarthy's witch hunts, the ADA . . ." Do the editors concede, in retrospect, that such was the nature of the ADA's attacks on the Senator? Or is their language merely sloppy? And we are particularly interested in the statement, "Whether Hiss was a Communist is irrelevant . . .", which the editors preferred—or is their language merely sloppy?—to saying, "That Hiss was a Communist is irrelevant." It may be that at Harvard, academic pace-setter, students are now being brought up to think of the ADA as the McCarthyite wing in the great new political spectrum fashioned by apostles of the Vital Center.

NATIONAL REVIEW is proud to announce that Major General Charles A. Willoughby, director of Intelligence in the Pacific during the Second World War, and during the Korean war, and author, in 1954, of *MacArthur 1941-1951,* has joined the magazine as an "associate and contributor." We are proud, also, to announce that Professor Revilo Oliver, of the University of Illinois, will serve in the same capacity.

NATIONAL TRENDS

L. BRENT BOZELL

In the last week's report on East-West trade, this columnist made only passing reference to perhaps the most significant fact disclosed by the McClellan proceedings, namely: that the notions of the Executive branch about what is its business, and nobody else's, have become for all practical purposes, The Law. Or to put this more concisely: the argument that "separation of powers" permits the Executive branch to treat the administration of government as its private concern is no longer the occasional (and by past consensus, arbitrary) refuge of chief executives for supressing the details of "embarrassing conversations"; it has achieved doctrinal status. So that Congress is now, at the discretion of the Executive, barred from exercising its constitutional prerogative to superintend the execution of its laws.

The running dispute between the McClellan Committee and Administration witnesses as to what information Congress was entitled to, involved two distinct categories of information: 1) "classified" data, the divulgence of which (the Administration said) might impair the efficiency and morale of government employees. In the first category were the various embargo lists and the criteria employed by U.S. officials in determining which items were sufficiently non-strategic to be decontrolled. In the second, the recommendations of JOC, the views of the interested Departments and those of certain officials.

As regards classified data, the McClellan Committee confirmed Congress' surrender (at the time of the Army-McCarthy and the Watkins hearings) on the basic issue. The Committee, that is to say, questioned whether the data wanted was *properly* classified; but no one on the Committee, not even Senator McCarthy, took the position that had been official Republican dogma during the Truman regime, namely: that the appropriate congressional committee should have unrestricted access to classified data; and that it should make its *own* determination whether public divulgence of the data would jeopardize security.

As regards unclassified data, the Administration's position was roughly this: Congress is entitled to find out what U.S. policy *is* (but only in certain areas, and *then* only if it succeeds in making an intolerable nuisance of itself). Under no circumstances, however, is Congress entitled, by right, to learn how and by whom such policies are made. (Congress may, of course, get this latter kind of information, Senator Jackson caustically observed, when the Administration is seeking an appropriation for, say, technical aid to India and can reinforce its argument by citing a clever project thought up by its expert on West Bengali drainage problems; but it is for the Executive to decide whether the discussion of its household affairs will be useful or will damage employee "efficiency and morale.")

Secretary Weeks' Assumption

Secretary Weeks remarked blandly in response to Senator McCarthy's demand for the reasoning behind the trade decontrol decision:

> I assume, Senator, that you are interested in the net result . . . [achieved by] those who are responsible for the action taken . . . I assume that is what you want to know . . . [However] all the pieces of advice, and pieces of paper, or what-not, in intra-Departmental and inter-agency discussion that have been had on the working level must be [withheld] under this separation of powers.

Of course, the Secretary did not really assume any such thing. The Committee was obviously very much interested, for example, in whether Defense Department experts had counselled against disembargoing certain metals and machine tools; and if so, *who* "on the working level" (assuming it happened there) overruled Defense. Congress, in other words, needed the withheld information in order to make informed judgments a) whether the decontrol decision was wise, and b) whether the employment of certain strategic government officials, for whose salaries Congress provides, is in the national interest.

What Mr. Weeks did assume—and with evident justification—is that Congress is not disposed to get rough in order to obtain the information it needs in order to discharge its duties responsibly.

Mr. Eisenhower's Order

Now how did the Administration justify its position? Most of the time, during the McClellan hearings, Administration witnesses acted as though the justification was self-evident. But when pressed, they invariably cited, as conclusive authority, President Eisenhower's Executive Order of May 17, 1954. This order, let us recall, was designed to prevent disclosure of the details of the famous White House meeting in January 1954, at which the Administration, reportedly, decided to take the offensive against Messrs. McCarthy, Cohn and Schine. The fact was thus brought home to the Committee that Congress, in its eagerness to reduce Senator McCarthy, had inadvertently acquiesced in the reduction of Congress.

Administration witnesses behaved as though Mr. Eisenhower's Order was nothing more than a previously and authoritatively established interpretation of the "separation of powers" doctrine. Actually, however, the Order had neither legal authority nor respectable precedent behind it. True, during the MacArthur hearings Harry Truman had forbidden his military chiefs to discuss the background of his decision to dismiss the Far Eastern commander; but Republicans at the time had screamed their heads off about Executive "arrogance" and "highhandedness." The best *legal* authority Administration lawyers could cite in support of their position at the McClellan hearings was the case of *Boske v. Comingore*. Senator Ervin pointed out, however, that the withholding of executive documents in that case was upheld by the Supreme Court on the grounds that the withholding had been authorized by an *Act of Congress*.

Notwithstanding their fragile legal foundation, the Executive's views on its prerogative of secrecy are as se-

(*Continued on p.* 12)

The Bricker Amendment: Its Background and Meaning

Ten questions that explore the background and purposes of the movement to curb, by constitutional amendment, the scope and jurisdiction of treaties

JAMES BURNHAM

"No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation." (Constitution of the United States, ART. I, Sec. 10.)

"[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur." (ART. II, Sec. 2.)

"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." (ART. VI.)

"A provision of a treaty or other international agreement which conflicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect." (*Text of a proposed Constitutional Amendment, approved by the Senate Judiciary Committee and now before Congress as a Joint Resolution.*)

1. How were treaties handled by the United States prior to the adoption of the Constitution?

Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress, directly or through its agents, negotiated treaties and other international agreements. During the Revolution, Congress secured foreign money, goods and arms. Congress successfully negotiated the Treaty of Peace with England, as well as other treaties with France, Sweden and the Netherlands. Its envoys—among them Jefferson, Adams, Franklin and Jay—were men of the first rank.

Though the performance of Congress in foreign affairs was reasonably good, its actions were not accepted by individual states as binding. South Carolina, Georgia, New Jersey, Virginia and Pennsylvania, for example, carried on foreign negotiations on their own and refused to accept the terms of truces, agreements and treaties that Congress had signed. This weakened the authority of the United States in international affairs, and opened them up to foreign intrigue. Moreover, constant consideration of foreign affairs by Congress as a whole consumed much time, and resulted in leaks of confidential information.

2. Were there disputes in the Constitutional Convention over the treaty-making provisions?

There was no dispute over the clause, quoted above, that makes treaties "the supreme Law of the Land." The Fathers were convinced that there must be one foreign policy for the new republic.

In early drafts the treaty power was assigned to the Senate. As the President's position in the proposed government was more fully explored, a predominant share in treaty-making was, without much debate, shifted to his office. Political theory regarded the conduct of foreign affairs as primarily an executive function. In international relations, the government would be acting in its corporate, national aspect, which the Presidency most directly symbolized.

On September 8 and 9, a week before the end of the Convention, James Wilson of Pennsylvania moved that treaties should be submitted to both Houses of Congress, as in the case of ordinary domestic laws. His motion was defeated 10 to 1 on the 8th and 9 to 1 on the 9th, in favor of Senate confirmation. The Senate would be small; its members experienced and discreet. Through the Senate, the structure of which recognized the reality of the states as political units, the states would have a vote in deciding the international contracts by which they were to be bound.

The delegates believed that confirmation by two thirds of the Senate would give more protection against usurpation than would confirmation by a majority of both Houses. Wilson (after his first vote lost) and Rufus King of Massachusetts, arguing that the two-thirds requirement "puts it into the power of a minority to control the will of a majority," called for confirmation by a simple Senate majority. They were voted down. Pierce Butler of South Carolina stressed that the treaty provision must give "necessary security against ambitious and corrupt Presidents."

The Fathers understood that risks were inherent in the treaty power. George Mason of Virginia remarked on August 15 (when the draft still left the entire treaty power in the hands of the Senate) that the Senate "could sell . . . the whole country by means of treaties." In the final draft, President and Senate were to check each other. Moreover, appropriations to carry out the provisions of a treaty would have to be voted as ordinary laws, thus giving the whole Congress an additional check.

3. Was there anything tricky in the wording of the "supremacy clause" (quoted above)?

Not as the Fathers understood things. The clause uses both tenses of the verb, in referring to treaties "made, or which shall be made," as the result of a motion by James Madison, seconded by Gouverneur Morris,

on August 25 and unanimously agreed to. "This insertion," Madison explains, "was meant to obviate all doubt concerning the force of treaties pre-existing."

According to the doctrine accepted by the Fathers, "the authority of the United States," after formation of the new government, would be derived solely from, and rest solely on, the Constitution. Treaties "which shall be made under the authority of the United States" meant, therefore, treaties made in accordance with and subject to the Constitution. Jefferson's *Manual* (Sec. LII) asserts: "Treaties are legislative acts. A treaty is a law of the land . . . The President and Senate can not do by treaty what the whole government is interdicted from doing in any way."

Under our system there are three kinds of law: 1) the Constitution itself, its various provisions and amendments; 2) laws passed by a majority of both Houses of Congress and signed by the President (or passed by two thirds of both Houses over his veto, or allowed to become law without Presidential signature); 3) treaties negotiated by the President and approved by two thirds of the Senate. The first category of laws (the Constitution) has priority over the other two, in case of conflict. If there is conflict between the last two types (or between two laws belonging to one of these types), then the more recent enactment prevails.

From this doctrine it follows that Congress can invalidate a treaty, or obligations thereunder, by passing an ordinary (domestic) law. "A law violating a treaty ratified by a pre-existing law," Madison stated at the Convention on July 23, "might be respected by the Judges as a law, though an unwise or perfidious one. A law violating a Constitution established by the people themselves, would be considered by the Judges as null and void."

This conception has been explicitly upheld by the Supreme Court, as in *Whitney v. Robertson* (1887), wherein the Court sustained an Act of Congress that conflicted with a treaty previously entered into with the Dominican Republic. "By the Constitution a Treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of like obligation, with an Act of legislation. Both are declared by that instrument to be the supreme law of the land, and . . . the one last in date will control the other."

Senator John W. Bricker

4. How did the treaty provisions work out?

The Senate never played as active a role as the Fathers originally expected. However, until recent years the treaty provisions functioned reasonably well, and were seldom questioned on fundamental constitutional grounds. There were disputes between the Executive and the Senate or Congress, and between the Senate and the House, but these did not get out of hand. The courts moved cautiously in the treaty field. No treaty was ever held unconstitutional.

5. Why has a dispute over the treaty power arisen in recent years?

A. The development of modern technology, world economic interrelation and world war have brought foreign affairs into more integral relation with domestic affairs.

B. Our own government, and particularly its Executive branch, have enormously expanded. Through the indirect effect of international agreements, as in other ways, the federal government encroaches on functions constitutionally reserved to the states and the people. The Executive, in turn, tends to usurp functions constitutionally assigned in whole or part to the Legislature. This is openly marked by the increased use of "executive agreements," not submitted to the Senate for ratification, in place of treaties.

C. Beginning with the Hague International Court and the League of Nations, various international bodies have been formed. They tend to restrict or absorb national sovereignties. By treaties, the United States has adhered to a number of such international bodies.

D. Court decisions have thrown into doubt the meaning of the treaty-making power. These include:

a) *Missouri v. Holland* (1920). The Supreme Court upheld, on the basis of a 1916 treaty with Great Britain, a regulation concerning the taking of migratory birds that had been invalidated when previously before the Court on the basis of an Act of Congress. Judge Holmes, for the Court, implied that the scope of the treaty-making power was wider than that of Acts of Congress. Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison comment in the latest (1955) edition of their standard text, *The American Constitution*:

> The theoretical implications of this decision were astounding. If a treaty could accomplish anything of a national character so long as its subject matter were plausibly related to the general welfare, what limits were there to federal authority, if exercised in pursuance of the treaty-making power? The decision, in fact, seemed to open a serious breach in the limited character of federal sovereignty.

b) *United States v. Pink* (1942). The Supreme Court held that executive agreements could in some instances be enforced as internal law.

c) *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp* (1936). In an early case (*Penhallow v. Doane*, 1795), counsel arguing before the Supreme Court had stated:

> A formal compact is not essential to the institution of government. Every nation that governs itself, under what form soever, without any dependence on a foreign power, is a sovereign state. In every society there must be a sovereignty. The powers of war form an inherent characteristic of national sovereignty.

This argument was not accepted then by the Court, but in a new and expanded form it reappears in Judge Sutherland's opinion, for the Court, in 1936:

> The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and

such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of our internal affairs . . . The investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution. The power to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.

6. What is at issue in the dispute?

What is generally at issue is the threatened subversion, through a novel interpretation of the treaty power, of our Constitution and our traditional form of government. The specifically threatened subversions are: a) further Executive aggrandizement through use of the treaty power (and allied powers); b) further aggrandizement of the federal government as a whole at the expense of the states; c) transfer of sovereignty, or attributes thereof, to one or another international body.

These three are, of course, legitimate objectives for citizens to pursue. However, they are incompatible with our Constitution and our traditional form of government. Those, therefore, who continue to believe in the Constitution and our traditional form of government, contend that these objectives should be sought, if sought, through the prescribed methods of amending our existing Constitution, not through what amounts to a verbal subterfuge.

7. Is the danger real or just a bugbear?

Up until a generation ago, the danger of constitutional subversion via the treaty power—though it had been recognized in theory—could be considered academic. But it is either naive or disingenuous to continue to brush it off. From the judicial side, this is shown by the cases mentioned above. It is also plain from the historical record. President Roosevelt carried through the destroyers-for-bases deal and the wartime politico-military conferences (Quebec, Cairo, Teheran, Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta) without participation by Congress. They were not purely military acts. Their domestic consequences were pervasive and lasting. They thus exemplify both Executive usurpation and the accomplishment of internal changes through the conduct of foreign policy.

Our membership in the UN and its allied organizations continuously raises the problem of sovereignty. Can acts of the UN commit our nation to war, to peace, to alliances, to foreign economic and military ventures, to alteration in our domestic rules and arrangements? Do its acts have in any measure the force of law in our courts? President Truman submitted the question of military action in Korea to the UN Security Council but not to the U. S. Congress. Cases are now pending in our courts wherein UN acts are cited as legally relevant to domestic law. In its brief in the Youngstown (steel seizure) case, the government cited UN obligations in support of the President's action. An *amicus curiae* brief recently submitted in the Communist Party registration case, now before the Supreme Court, cites the UN Declaration of Human Rights as part of its argument against the finding of the Control Board and the constitutionality of the McCarran Act. Under the Status of Forces Treaty, U. S. citizen-soldiers, present involuntarily in foreign countries, are being tried in foreign courts according to foreign laws and procedures. In some instances they are being denied, through the effect of the treaty, their constitutionally guaranteed rights.

It is also relevant to note that a number of our citizens avowedly favor both Executive supremacy and world government, and are prepared to use the treaty power as one way of advancing their aims.

8. Does the new form of "the Bricker amendment," quoted above, answer the problem?

The amendment now before Congress upon motion by Senator Dirksen would seem to remove the critical ambiguity that has been introduced into the interpretation of the treaty power. It returns the treaty power to its place within the structure of the Constitution as a whole. It makes explicit the priority of the Constitution to all treaties, as to all other laws, enacted under the Constitution, and denies by clear implication the contention of Judge Sutherland that the treaty power has —in our system—an origin independent of the Constitution.

It is impossible to predict the findings of the courts, but it seems probable that this amendment would upset the reasoning of *Missouri v. Holland* that regulation of migratory birds could be invalid (as an invasion of States Rights) under an Act of Congress but valid under a treaty. The Status of Forces Treaty could hardly be sustained in the face of the amendment's flat declaration that "a treaty . . . which conflicts with any provision of this Constitution shall not be of any force or effect." This treaty abridges at least the rights guaranteed by Amendments IV to VIII. Under the proposed amendment it would be clear that the political measures of such purely Executive undertakings as the destroyers-for-bases deal, the Atlantic Charter and the wartime conferences do not, of themselves, commit the United States.

The act of adopting the amendment would have a historic and symbolic importance. Expressing the will of Congress and the people to maintain the basic principles of our traditional form of government against subversion through the treaty power, it would undoubtedly affect the conduct of Congress, the Executive and the Courts.

Such probable consequences justify active support of the amendment in its present (or a similar) form.

Adoption of the amendment will not of itself solve all of the constitutional problems which have prompted its proposal. Public apathy and congressional irresponsibility have also been conditions of the misuse of the treaty power. Congressmen who express alarm over what UN membership might do to our Constitution seldom recall that the Senate ratified the UN Charter 89-2. The Senate has failed to make simple changes in its rules that would assure its more active participation in the conduct of foreign affairs: for example, to require that the text of all Executive agreements must be deposited with the Senate, and that there must be a roll-call vote on treaty ratification.

Although there has been much congressional criticism of UNESCO, Congress has each year voted with-

out penetrating debate the United States share of UNESCO appropriations. Indeed, the entire UN organization is potentially at the mercy of Congress' appropriating power.

Abuse of the treaty power has been only one element in this century's aggrandizement of the national government in general and of the Executive in particular. The same trend is present in connection with education, social security, race relations, and so on. An amendment specifically dealing with the treaty power can, therefore, have only a partial influence in blocking this drift toward statism and away from our traditional form of limited government.

9. Granted that a treaty-control amendment is only one phase of a campaign to preserve our form of government, is the current phrasing of the amendment the most suitable?

The current one-sentence form is the resultant of years of experience in the fight on this issue. It has the theoretical advantage of simplicity, and the practical advantage of a broad support. However, it omits direct reference to the most crucial problem actually at stake: the problem of sovereignty.

By our Constitution the people of the United States have lodged national sovereignty in a Congress, President and Supreme Court. By virtue of treaties and international agreements, there now exist in the world various international bodies in which the United States is represented. Now these international bodies, by a kind of historical inertia as well as by the deliberate action of those who favor world government, tend to assume attributes of sovereignty: e.g., the war and treaty-making powers; fiscal and commercial powers; legal jurisdiction over individuals.

Such transfer of sovereignty from national to international bodies may or may not be desirable. In any case it is incompatible with the traditional conception of our Constitution and our government.

The transfer of sovereignty does not take place directly and immediately on the adoption of the treaty that gives birth to the international body. It occurs when and to the extent that subsequent actions of *continuing* international bodies (such as the UN's Security Council, or UNESCO) may be given the force of law within our country.

In reality this is the great present problem not foreseen by the Fathers. They understood that the provisions agreed to in treaties must be given the force of domestic law—otherwise there cannot be genuine treaties. But they never considered the entirely different question of giving the force of domestic law to unspecified actions that would be taken by continuing international bodies set up under treaties. The latter is equivalent to the surrender, at least in part, of national sovereignty in favor of world government. Our Constitution as it now reads does not make the relevant distinction.

In order to answer this problem explicitly, a second sentence ought therefore to be added to the present text of the treaty-control amendment. The sense (though not necessarily the precise wording) would be as follows:

"No action by an international body shall of itself have the force of domestic law within the United States."

This wording would not prevent the U. S. from acting in concert with an international body. It would merely require that the action, to be given the force of law for and in the U. S., must also be authorized as our Constitution prescribes. For example: a declaration of war, of peace, of taxes, of "human rights," by the UN would be law for the U. S. only if appropriate action to the same effect were also taken by Congress, the President and, where constitutionally relevant, the states.

10. Will a treaty control amendment hamper the conduct of our foreign policy?

That it will do so is the principal argument of the amendment's opponents. The objection may have had some weight with respect to some of the earlier forms of the amendment; the effect of which might have been a return to the condition under the Articles of Confederation where individual states could decide for themselves whether to be bound by a treaty. But in the current form, with or without the addition suggested above, the method of conducting our foreign affairs remains just what it has traditionally been. There is no reason why it should be more or less prompt and effective, with one proviso: the President and the government will indeed be hampered if the conduct of foreign policy breaches the permissible limits of our constitutional system. That sort of hampering is, of course, precisely the purpose of the amendment.

NATIONAL TRENDS

(Continued from p. 8)

cure as had they been explicitly inscribed in the Constitution. Committee members McClellan, Symington, Jackson, Ervin and McCarthy are momentarily sore—possibly to the point of rebellion; not so erstwhile "conservative" Republicans, Senators Mundt and Bender. And therein lies the key to the demise of Congress: with few exceptions, the party in control of the White House declines, and will predictably continue to decline, to take steps that might embarrass the Party Leader.

The prospect of Congress doing something about East-West trade is slightly brighter.

Three moves are now under consideration: 1) a Joint Resolution requiring immediate divulgence to Congress of any executive agreement to relax the China embargo (i.e., the kind of agreement that was made secretly two years ago with respect to the anti-Soviet embargo); 2) an amendment to the Battle Act that would put allied shipment of strategic production materials to the Communist bloc on a par with shipment of munitions (i.e., would make termination of U.S. aid in *both* cases mandatory); and 3) as an alternative to 2, a rider to this year's foreign-aid appropriation that would forbid payment from the appropriation to countries that ship specified strategic items to the Communists.

Given the tempers (in some cases conscientious, in others strictly political) of certain strategic Democrats, the passage of such measures is conceivable—should Senator Knowland decide to swing his Republican followers behind them. On the other hand, Senator McClellan, as chairman of the Investigations Subcommittee, would be expected to make the initial recommendations. And McClellan's time is now, rather patly, preempted by the lobbying investigation.

The Liberal Line...

WILLMOORE KENDALL

To: All Echelons
From: Content Committee, Liberal Propaganda Machine

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to direct operatives' attention to:

— certain scurrilous allegations about our handling of current criticisms of the Administration's defense program (see "The Liberal Line," NATIONAL REVIEW, March 28, 1956);

— a recent article that may pose problems as to our future handling of this topic (see Hanson Baldwin, "The Military Outlook," *New York Times*, March 4, 1956);

— current thinking in this office about our role in the developing "debate" about military affairs.

2. The alleged weaknesses in President Eisenhower's military policies, as NATIONAL REVIEW'S columnist notes, have indeed received special treatment in the Alsops' columns. The Alsops, that is to say, have taken cognizance from week to week of the charges that can be brought against these policies, and have made statements about them that, when pieced together, do seem to constitute a "damning indictment" of the Administration's defense program. Our other commentators, meanwhile, have indeed either a) avoided the entire matter, or b) argued that President Eisenhower knows what he is doing, and will choose his own good time for refuting the charges. To suggest, however, that our purpose here has been to "stake out" a position that, at some later moment, our organization as a whole might "move into," is gratuitous and absurd.

In this, as in all such matters, our role is to advance the interests of the United States as interpreted by men and women of the right cast of mind, and, within certain limits set by the nature of our task, to convey to our target audience an accurate picture of national and world affairs, together with indications as to the only correct policies for the United States to follow.

We are not partisans: we adopt "positions" only where we have a firm lead from our colleagues in the upper reaches of the government service. Because of certain highly placed officers in the armed forces, they unfortunately do not have with respect to defense policy the free hand that, fortunately, they have in other matters. Our function, in the absence of a firm lead from them, is to maintain *flexibility*, and to guard against surprises that might undermine our prestige in the eyes of our target audience and thus render difficult the performance of our general educational mission.

If we had *not* taken cognizance, somewhere in our output, of the alleged inadequacies of the Eisenhower defense program, we should have laid ourselves open to the charge that we had suppressed a significant point of view; while if we had directed attention to the charges, by permitting other commentators to urge them, we should have been getting out ahead of our colleagues within the government service — *who know, as we do not, whether the charges are well-founded.* In either case, we should have sacrificed our flexibility.

3. We do not exclude the possibility that we might one day be asked to convince our target audience that the Eisenhower Administration has put the United States, militarily, at the mercy of the USSR. But such a mission would be imposed upon us only if a) leadership of the Republican Party were to fall into the hands of reactionary elements (that is, elements that could predictably seek to deprive the American people of the social gains that our operatives in Washington have won for them over the past twenty years, or seek to launch the United States upon a so-called crusade against world Communism), or b) the leaders of the Democratic Party were to force a debate on the adequacy of the Administration's defense program, *and seemed likely to win it.* Both these eventualities seem fairly remote at this time. Senators Jackson, Symington and Fulbright may, for a time, continue to harass the Administration with talk about the inadequacies of the defense program; and, insofar as they do this, we shall be obliged to report their statements and give to them, via the Alsops, a certain measure of moderate support. They will, however, ultimately be silenced by their fellow-Democrats, who will fight shy of any open challenge to the President's military prestige and, in any case, are unlikely to go along with these senators on any of the possible answers to the question, "Why *should* we be militarily strong against the Soviet Union?" An indictment of the Administration's defense program can be successfully urged, if at all, only by a party committed to a definable policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and world Communism. And this organization, under its general directive to discourage all types of thinking that might lead to the emergence of such a policy can forestall any attempt within the Democratic Party to press alleged analogies between our position vis-à-vis the USSR and our position twenty years ago vis-à-vis Fascism.

4. The Hanson Baldwin article referred to above raises problems for this organization of a slightly different character. Operatives are reminded once again that Mr. Baldwin, like his colleague Arthur Krock, still refuses to become one of us, is therefore not subject to this committee's directives, and has a considerable following of persons who are convinced that his writings on military topics are not politically motivated. Operatives will note especially his statement that the period is "coming to an end" when Eisenhower's "personal prestige in the strategic and military field was so great that critics generally seethed in silence." They will note also that he by no means dismisses as unfounded the view that Eisenhower's budget policies stand in the way of adequate provision for national defense. Mr. Baldwin, unlike the Democratic senators, may well try to force a public debate on military policy, and might, despite our efforts to prevent it, succeed in doing so. Operatives may, in that event, expect further guidance from this committee.

Connecticut

State's Liberal Elite Win Publicity but Few Votes; Conservative Prospects Bright

SAM M. JONES

The *mores* of the Nutmeg State are somewhat changed since Colonial days when New Haven's famous "blue laws" provided the death penalty for adultery and imposed heavy fines for "concealing or entertaining Quaker or other blasphemous hereticks." Time has shattered the political and social concepts of the early settlers; but it does not follow, as some critics aver, that Connecticut thinking is now dominated by left-wing intellectuals. Few native sons are included in the tiny minority of the articulate elite, including New York commuters and refugees from Europe, Los Angeles and the Middle West, whose collective voice enunciates the dogma of Liberal conformity. At the national level the influence of this Liberal coterie is considerable; but back home it seems to have encountered the law of diminishing returns.

Such titans of the Liberal hierarchy as former Governor Chester Bowles, former Senator William Benton and former Governor John Lodge have been ousted from public office by the voters since 1950. They have received consolation from Washington, but the record of rejection at home remains. The over-all record suggests that Connecticut's highly publicized dedication to the Liberal conformity is an illusion.

Conservative Republicans have carried the state in all but four of the Presidential elections in this century. Wilson won in 1912, but not in '16; in the depths of the 1932 depression, Hoover outpolled Roosevelt, but FDR was the winner in the next three elections. In 1948 Dewey defeated Truman by 14,000 votes. Four years later Eisenhower carried every Connecticut county, topping Stevenson's total by 130,000. With this statistical record and the state's political history, *plus peace and prosperity*, Republican leaders are confident but not complacent concerning the prospects for November.

Republican realists are not as sanguine as the pollsters on the subject of Ike's popularity. They are aware that there will be no nation-wide or state-wide chains of Democrats-for-Eisenhower clubs, and that the Republican ticket will not carry any Southern state. They know that enthusiasm among the GOP rank and file is below the level of 1952. But they believe that so long as there is no active war, no material economic decline and no adverse change in the President's physical condition, the odds are distinctly favorable against any Democratic challenger now on the horizon. This Connecticut viewpoint both reflects and confirms the analysis of party leaders in Washington.

Connecticut has had a somewhat larger transfusion of New Deal and Middle-of-the-Road blood than some of the other Eastern states, but the GOP conservatives have made material gains in recent years. Democratic analysts look to labor organizations for more than usual support in the coming election, but the state's tremendous industrial economy is in excellent condition. Connecticut manufactures aircraft engines, arms, helicopters, brass and copper products, builders' hardware and other commodities of premium demand in the domestic and world market today. It is less affected than many other industrial states by a slowdown in automobile production because of the independent nature of its internal economy.

Both Senators and five of the six-man House delegation are Republican. There is some opinion that the numerical division in the House will remain unchanged by the election although the lone Democratic Congressman, Thomas J. Dodd of West Hartford, may be nominated to oppose Senator Prescott Bush. Whether Dodd runs for House or Senate, his district (the first) is considered safely Democratic.

Rep. Albert P. Morano, in the fourth district, was the only member of the delegation to surpass Dodd's total vote in 1954—57.6 per cent as compared to 57. None of the other Republican winners—Horace Seely-Brown, (2d), Albert W. Cretella (3d), James T.Patterson (5th), and Antoni N. Sadlak (at large)—polled more than 53 per cent. Their favorable showing in re-election estimates is partly based on Eisenhower's strength.

The Senate race is attracting the widest interest. Rep. Dodd, a former FBI agent and former assistant U.S. District Attorney now completing his second term in Congress, is considered a formidable challenger to Bush's bid for re-election, but at this writing it is uncertain whether Dodd or ex-Senator William Benton will be the Democratic nominee. Benton was beaten in '52 (largely through the efforts of Senator McCarthy) and now seeks a chance for a comeback. In a Bush-Benton contest the Republican's chances would probably be favored in the betting. If Dodd is the Democratic nominee, the odds are likely to be even. Senator Bush, a partner in Brown Brothers Harriman & Co. and a director of other business enterprises, states in his congressional autobiography that "he severed all corporate business connections upon entering the Senate."

Connecticut elects its Governor for a four-year term. The Democratic incumbent, former Congressman Abraham Ribicoff, defeated Governor Lodge in the close election of 1954. Ribicoff's record as a vote-getter and administrator makes him a logical contender for Senator Purtell's seat in '58. Some Democrats, however, take exception to Ribicoff's political candor. During the period before "the great decision" he expressed doubt whether the Democrats could carry Connecticut with Eisenhower heading the Republican ticket. Stevenson is Ribicoff's announced choice for the Democratic nomination and inferentially the choice of John Bailey, the acknowledged autocrat of Connecticut's Democracy. The Republican delegation will go for Eisenhower with enthusiasm at the Convention and the anti-Nixon sentiment (strident before the New Hampshire primary) may have completely disappeared along with the campaign to support Massachusett's Governor Herter for second place on the ticket.

Letter from London

F. A. VOIGT

Britain Caught in Cyprus

None of the interested powers—except, of course, Russia and her dependents—wishes Great Britain to withdraw militarily from Cyprus.

Greece, in particular, has gone out of her way in offering Great Britain every facility that would make the island serve the strategic needs of the Atlantic Powers. She has even offered to place other positions, whether on Greek islands or on the Greek mainland, at our disposal for strategic purposes. America is constructing military installations on Crete, and there has been no trouble on the island in consequence, or any protest on the part of Greek public opinion, for Crete is being turned into an American base without any American interference with the administration or the politics of the island. Thus, Greek national sentiment is, if anything, comforted rather than offended by the presence of a powerful ally on Greek soil.

As I pointed out in NATIONAL REVIEW before (December 28, 1955) Cyprus would have been at peace, the strategic needs of the Atlantic Powers would have been satisfied, and the Anglo-Hellenic alliance would have been consolidated, if Great Britain had agreed to transfer the civil administration of the island from the British to the Hellenic Crown. To have done so would have meant no sacrifice whatever and no loss of prestige. Did Great Britain lose prestige when, in 1864, she agreed to the union of the Ionian Islands with Greece? Cyprus has, in fact, been a liability all along. The Cypriots have never been British subjects willingly.

From our point of view, the sole importance of the island today is strategic; and this has been so only since we withdrew from the Suez Canal Zone.

What, then, is the case for the British persistence in rejecting the Cypriot demand for union (or *Enosis*, as it is called)? The answer is that there is no case at all.

All the arguments urged by the British Government and its supporters are either invalid or irrelevant or of so little weight that they should never have been allowed to affect British policy. Cyprus has become a party matter and, in its comments, the press follows conventional lines. The Conservative press makes Cyprus a matter of prestige and of "standing by the Empire." The Liberal and Labor press is, for once, right. But it is right for the wrong reasons. It supports the Cypriot demand for union with Greece; but it underrates the overriding necessity—that we must stay in Cyprus strategically, whatever happens.

We are told that Turkey does not wish Cyprus to unite with Greece. And indeed she does not. But what has Turkey to fear from the union? It is true that the Turkish minority in Cyprus—composed of British, not Turkish, subjects, by the way—would rather continue to live under British rule. This is a matter of preference which certainly deserves respect. But can it count against the deeply rooted wish of the Greek-speaking Christian majority (one of the oldest Christian communities in the world) to live under Hellenic rule? It would be a different matter if the Turkish minority had any reason to fear oppression under the Greek Crown. But there are, today, more Turks in Greece than there are in Cyprus; and they have nothing to complain of.

It is alleged that Greece is an unstable country and, by implication, an unreliable ally. The fact is that she decided in favor of the Western powers as far back as 1936; that she did not depart from her decision even after Poland and France had fallen and Yugoslavia had come to terms with Germany; that she did not capitulate even when overrun by the German, Italian and Bulgarian armies; and that of all countries in the world, she fought the hardest battles against Communism. Until a year ago, she could be counted upon to fight on our side in all circumstances—even if she herself were not directly attacked. Today Greece will certainly fight—if attacked. Today she will fight for no other reason. To this extent she has become "unreliable." But this "unreliability" is wholly the result of Britain's Cypriot policy.

Under the Greek Crown—and under British military command—the Cypriots will have an interest in the defense of their island and of Greece. The Cypriot Communists, who, through the absence of representative government, have been left as the only well-organized political party on the island, will no longer have a chance of causing trouble, for their temporary alliance with the Cypriot nationalists against us will have come to an end and the newly installed Greek administration will, in case of need, deal with them by methods which our own public opinion does not favor—methods that are recognized as the only effective ones in a country that has experienced terrorism and massacre at Communist hands.

By refusing the Cypriot demand for union with Greece, via home rule, we strike at our own security in Cyprus. By granting the demand before it is too late, we shall have security against all forms of subversion on the island. What, then, is the explanation for so indefensible a policy as that of the British Government?

There are two answers. First, the military advisers of the British Government rate Turkey above all other allies in Europe. They are assiduous in avoiding anything that might cause offense in Ankara. The result is that Turkey grows more and more exacting in her pretensions. (No country dependent on American aid has been as self-willed in rejecting American advice as Turkey.) British governments can no more help appeasing some foreign power than a kitten can help chasing its own tail; and Turkey is today the object of appeasement. It is, of course, true that the Turkish alliance is vital to the security of the Mediterranean and the Middle East. But this alliance is not strengthened by British obsequiousness toward Turkey.

Secondly, having withdrawn from

India, Abadan, Egypt, the Sudan, and so on, we felt we ought to make a stand somewhere. This "selling out the Empire" simply could not go on. And this is the root of the matter: our attitude with regard to Cyprus is weakness posturing as strength. We regard Turkey as strong and, therefore, we go out of our way—and much further than is necessary—to appease her. But in Greece we discovered, or thought we discovered, a power sufficiently weak to defy.

Again and again we were warned by the Greek Government of what would happen if we persisted in our refusal even to discuss the demand for *Enosis*. These warnings were fully justified by events which no conceivable Greek government could control. We then were, to our own surprise, but to the surprise of no one else, faced with a rebellion waged with a treachery and a ferocity which had seemed commendable when used against the Germans but were to be condemned when used against ourselves. We could no longer refuse discussion. We negotiated with the real leader of the rebellion, Archbishop Makarios, while deprecating what we regarded as his un-Christian toleration of rebellion—forgetting that, in Greece, the nation and church are as one, and that the church militant is identical with the nation at war. We have now deported the rebel leader for leading a rebellion. The result is that there is no one left to negotiate with.

Now America seems to have spoken, and the Conservative *Daily Mail* no less than the Liberal *News Chronicle* protests with full lung-power against American "interference."

But what do we expect? The Balkan Alliance is shattered, the Anglo-Hellenic Alliance nearly so. The danger in the Middle East is appalling. It is only a matter of time before the Communist advance on the Aegean develops. We shall need every fighting man we can find—and are losing about 100,000 of the best (the present effectives of the Greek army). Some thousands of our own are immobilized by terrorists and school-children in Cyprus. British security and prestige are declining and, with them, the security and prestige of the Atlantic Alliance. Then can the United States remain inactive?

This observer is forced into the humiliating conclusion that there is only one remedy: that Great Britain be jerked out of this mire (in friendly fashion, of course) by her transatlantic ally; and that this same ally take upon herself the task, long overdue, of putting Turkey in its proper place.

Rewriting History

BEN RAY REDMAN

Right under our noses, but unnoticed by most of us, the historians are busy rewriting history. Or, at least, they are preparing to do so. Their activities stem from the belief that too many historical textbooks have in the past been infected with the virus of nationalism, and have excited in youthful breasts patriotic sentiments that are undesirable. The textbooks, they argue, must be purged of nationalistic fervor and prejudice, and students must learn to subordinate love of country to love of all mankind. Spurring the historians on is the United Nations, acting through its cultural agency UNESCO.

Already there have been many meetings of European historians, and agreements as to what should be done to soft-pedal patriotism in the textbooks to which Europeans are exposed. Frenchmen have agreed to write of Bismarck without using rude words, while Germans have pledged themselves to write of Napoleon in honeyed terms. Englishmen have decided that Germany must not be held at all responsible for starting World War One, and that her violation of Belgian neutrality should be described at worst as merely an unfortunate mistake. If everyone has only nice things to say of everyone else, the argument runs, we shall all stand a good chance of living happily ever after.

It is an interesting argument. But even more interesting is speculation as to what would happen if it were carried to its logical conclusion.

If history is to be rewritten so as not to arouse nationalistic feelings, we might as well do a thorough job of it, and make sure that history will not stir up unfortunate feelings of any kind; that it will hurt the sensibilities of no readers anywhere, and awaken no melancholy memories.

What, for example, must be the sentiments of the English when they read American accounts of the Boston Tea Party? Can we expect them to do anything but weep over the wanton destruction of so noble a beverage? Can we blame them if they denounce as barbarians a people capable of such a sacrilege? These questions answer themselves. Obviously the story of the Boston Tea Party must be rewritten in such a way as to spare the feelings of the British.

And what about the record of our treatment of the American Indian, as it now stands, with its tale of brutal force and broken promises—of a free people driven from their homeland? Could any Red Man read it without sorrow and resentment? Here, surely, is a chapter of our history that cries aloud for a new version that will picture the white man as bringing the blessings of civilization to his backward brother.

Nor can we overlook Sherman's march through Georgia. We cannot afford to let this incident continue to rankle in Southern memories. Let us, then, depict Sherman's men as bearers of sweetness and light, welcomed throughout Georgia with flowers, brass bands and kisses.

Yes, there is a great work of historical revision to be done. Indeed, as one surveys the field, the task promises to be endless. But there is one job of rewriting that should be given top priority, one man to be dealt with whose very name now evokes hatred, tears and loathing, whenever it is seen on the printed page. Can we possibly let Adolf Hitler's portrait remain as it has been painted, if we are to spare the feelings of all who read history? Must we not stress the fact that he liked babies? Or, better still, should we not erase his name completely from the records?

If we all get together and back the work of the revisionists, we may finally succeed in making true the remark of the gentleman who declared: "History is only lies agreed upon."

The Plight of Business Forecasting

Neither economics nor statistics nor any other branch of learning can render business forecasting "scientific." It must remain mere guesswork

LUDWIG VON MISES

People by and large know today that a boom brought forth by a policy of credit expansion and easy money cannot last forever and must sooner or later lead to a slump. They do not want to be taken by surprise and ruined. They are anxious to learn in time when the turning-point will come because they plan to arrange their affairs early enough so as not to be hurt by, or even to profit from, the crash. As they believe that economics is the art of predicting tomorrow's business conditions, they consult the economists.

"How will business be in the coming months?" asks the newspaperman when interviewing the economist. No convention of businessmen is held without the solicited presence of a professor of economics, or the head of a bank's research department, who in guarded language produces a cautiously qualified prediction about the nation's (or the world's) business. Whenever and wherever a businessman catches sight of an economist, he tries to sound him out about the future state of the market.

What Brings About the Slump

Economics explains the phenomenon of the trade cycle (i.e., the repeated emergence of periods of unusually good business that are after some time invariably followed by a reversal into unusually bad business) as the necessary effect of the attempts to manipulate the rate of interest. Governments and political parties are committed to the idea that it is good policy to lower the rate of interest below the height it would attain on a free market; and they believe that the expansion of bank credit is the right means to produce this desired effect. They do not realize that the boom which they artificially create by such credit expansion must finally result in the catastrophe of the depression.

Ludwig von Mises, famed author of Human Action *and other books on the free market economy, was recently honored for his courage in standing firm against the collectivists. (See editorial in last issue.)*

Spokesmen of governments tried to disparage the economists' explanation of the recurrence of economic depressions. They tried in vain. This economic doctrine, the so-called monetary or circulation-credit theory of the business cycle, is irrefutable. The fanatical supporters of inflationism, of unbalanced budgets and reckless government spending have, it is true, succeeded in banning sound theory from universities and textbooks; and they have founded special research institutions whose main purpose it is to put the monetary theory into oblivion. But their triumph is always shortlived. Today people are fully aware of the fact that credit expansion is the ultimate cause of the slump. All public declarations on the state of business, even those uttered by bureaucrats, are based upon a full acknowledgment of the monetary doctrine of the trade cycle. It is precisely the cognition of this theory's correctness that in the present boom period alarms businessmen and prompts them to inquire nervously about the date of the turning point.

Economics: Not Quantitative

Economics predicts the outcome of definite modes of conduct; in our case, the result of a policy of credit expansion. But economic prediction can never disclose anything about the quantitative relations concerned. There is not, and there cannot be such a thing as quantitative economics.

In the field of the natural sciences there prevail constant relations between definite magnitudes. By means of laboratory experiments the scientists are in a position to determine these constants and to make practical use of them in predictions and in technological design. But in human action there are no such constant relations between magnitudes. There, all quantities are variables or (as a more appropriate term describes them) historical data. It is therefore not due to an alleged backwardness, or to the much-talked-about "youth" of economic science, that it is not quantitative, but, as people say, "merely" qualitative. What does not exist cannot become a matter of scientific inquiry.

Economics can only tell us that a boom engendered by credit expansion will not last. It can tell us neither after *what* amount of credit expansion the slump will start nor *when* this event will occur. All that is said, whether by economists or by other people, about these quantitative and calendar problems partakes neither of economics nor of any other science. It is an attempt to anticipate future events by means of that specific "understanding" which is practised by *everybody* in *all* his dealings with his fellow man. It has the logical character that marks all anticipations of future events in human affairs—anticipations concerning the course of Russia's foreign policy, of religious and racial conditions in India or in Algeria, of ladies' fashions in 1960, of the political divisions in the U. S. Senate in 1970; but also of the future marital relations between Mr. X and his wife, or the success in life of a boy who has just celebrated his tenth birthday. There are people who assert that psychology may provide some help in such prognostications; however, it is not our task to examine this problem. We have mere-

ly to establish the fact that forecasts about the course of economic affairs cannot be considered as scientific.

Statistics: Necessarily Retrospective

The usual method employed in business forecasts is statistical and, thereby, retrospective.

The statistician recites a mass of statistical information, which necessarily refers to the past only, and works it into charts and curves. He is so preoccupied with arranging and rearranging the data available that he entirely fails to realize that they do not have any relevance to the problems in question. They refer to the past, not to the future. They depict trends that prevailed in the past and are, by and large, familiar to everybody. They in no way answer the questions that all people, and especially the businessmen, are asking. People know that trends can change; they are afraid that they will change; and they would like to know when the change will occur. But the statistician knows only what everybody knows, namely, that they have not yet changed.

In the sphere of human action statistics is a special method of historical research. It records historical facts in quantitative terms. History deals necessarily with the past, never with the future. If the future were merely a continuation of the trends that prevailed in the past, it would not be uncertain and we would not be in need of any forecasting. But as this is not the case, what is called economic forecasting is merely guessing.

Professional forecasters blame their much-talked-about failures on the fact that the figures available are insufficient and reach them too late. This apology misses the point. However complete and recent statistical information may be, it always remains information about the past and does not assert anything about the future.

The Self-Contradiction of Forecasting

People's ideas about the possibility of business forecasting, and its practical value for the conduct of one's own affairs, are self-contradictory and unrealizable.

The businessman thinks: If I know the date of the boom's collapse some time in advance, I will be in a position to sell my stocks and to reduce my inventories both of raw materials and of products at boom prices, and I will have cash and no debts at the critical moment. The man who entertains such ideas overlooks the fact that this knowledge could be helpful to him only if he *alone* has it while all other people are still *bullish*. But how could this occur if, as popular opinion assumes, economic doctrine enables the economists to predict the day of the crisis? Then all people will simultaneously learn the date of the impending crash. They will all consequently immediately try to adjust their transactions to this expectation. They will all forthwith stop buying and start selling. But then, as a consequence of this attitude, the catastrophic drop in prices, the slump, will at once appear; it will not wait for the distant day for which the economists have predicted it. Nobody would derive any advantage from the economists' forecast: at the very instant this forecast is uttered and accepted as correct, the crisis is already consummated.

From time immemorial people have known that the very act of predicting may change the actions of men and thus eliminate the forces that are required to bring about the predicted outcome. Obstinate fatalists have acquiesced in the illusion that all the attempts to avoid a prognosticated evil are futile; and that they even frequently, in some mysterious way, against the intention of the actor, make the prophecy take effect. No such subterfuge is permissable in our case. The very fact that people are putting faith in the forecast of a crash results in the annulment of the prediction: it *instantly* produces the crash. Thus, what the businessman wants to attain in asking the economist for information about the future of the market, could not be realized even if the economist were in a position to answer.

ON THE LEFT... C. B. R.

Mary Knowles Case. The Fund for the Republic was rebuked by the Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy and Objectives of the American Bar Association for the (unaccepted) grant of $5,000 to the Plymouth Meeting, Pennsylvania, library to make possible the employment of Mary Knowles, who had refused to testify regarding her Communist Party record.

Coast Guard. The government is trying to set aside the decision of the Ninth District Court of Appeals that has invalidated Coast Guard screening of subversive elements on the waterfront. The government is opposed by two Communist-promoted organizations, the Seamen's Defense Committee and the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee. A speaker in this campaign is Dr. J. Raymond Walsh, economist and former national research director of the CIO.

Between Two Fires. The Communist Party, USA, sent its "warm fraternal greetings to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," but William Z. Foster discloses that his party received a hot reception at the gathering. "At this time." he declares in the *Daily Worker,* "the membership of other Communist parties, including our own, are being questioned for not having criticized Stalin's errors." Fearing that the present denouement may result in the reinstatement of his rival, Earl Browder, he warns that "In the past, we had to learn at great cost, in the affair of the renegade Browder, the danger attendant upon allowing too much power to concentrate in the hands of one individual." In a veiled crack at Khrushchev, he points out that "the general line of Communist parties . . . has been to rely upon the self-criticism of the respective parties for estimates of their shortcomings, rather than to indulge in *general criticism from afar.*"

Red Keyhole. The Communist-sponsored World Peace Council will stage an international "peace conference" in Stockholm, April 4-9. On the agenda will be the question of disarmament and the limitation of atomic weapons in line with the current Communist world campaign on these questions.

Letter from the Continent

E. v. KUEHNELT-LEDDIHN

Munich

A little German book now being widely reviewed was published and edited by Mr. Patrick Boarman, erstwhile representative of the U.S. National Catholic Welfare Conference in Germany. It is a sensational volume entitled *The Christian and the Social-Minded [Free] Market Economy* (Stuttgart 1955). What was needed, it seems, was the initiative of an American to organize a meeting of the minds of European Catholics and Protestants who are enthusiastic believers in a free economy and the ideals of Neo-Liberalism.

Who are these "Neo-Liberals"? How do they differ from the people who call themselves "liberals" in America? To give a negative definition of "Neo-Liberalism" is easy: it has nothing whatsoever in common with liberalism in America, for even the old liberalism of Europe was radically different from its American namesake.

The term "Liberal" is of Spanish origin. For some time the British used the Spanish form *liberales*. Liberals were people who stood for personal freedom, plain and simple, and this interpretation was always valid on the Continent. Liberals, therefore, were suspicious of all forms of absolutism. The form of government extolled by the original liberals was the enlightened, constitutional monarchy, a government full of checks and balances. Some of the greatest exponents of original liberal thought were Count de Tocqueville, Boyer-Collard, Guizot and, somewhat later, Lord Acton. Most of the original liberals were convinced Christians (though adverse to clericalism). They were strongly entrenched in the aristocracy and in the upper bourgeoisie. They based their beliefs on intellectual foundations. They respected tradition. But they were indifferent to economic and sometimes even to social problems.

Whereas original liberalism continued strongly in England, where it slowly drifted nearer to conservatism, it degenerated on the Continent into so-called Palaeo-Liberalism. The subtle anti-clericalism of the original liberals became a real opposition to all faith. Darwin and Spencer profoundly influenced a Continental liberalism which adopted a kind of pseudo-theological optimism as its philosophy: if nobody intervenes in any way, they reasoned, the world will automatically roll along the broad road of progress. Palaeo-Liberalism rejected the concept of absolute truth and began to worship numbers, i.e., "democracy." Its dialectic result was the rise of Marxism and other totalitarianism.

Between the two wars, old liberalism expired on the Continent (surviving merely in a few minor spots, such as Switzerland). Its death left liberty without a political defender. True, there was Christianity and especially the Catholic Church, whose theologians, under the impact of modern tyranny, became increasingly interested in all aspects of human freedom. Yet the Church is neither able, nor qualified, nor predestined, to fill Europe's political and social void. Thus the flood of Christian books on liberty, the motto LIBERTAS on the coat of arms of Italy's *Democristiani*, the big Catholic Congress in Vienna two years ago under the slogan "Liberty and Dignity of Man," were all very heartening; but it was left to the Neo-Liberals to restate freedom in the political and social field.

There is, naturally, a certain affiliation between the new and old liberals all over Europe. They join in the various international congresses of the Liberal World Federation, as for instance last year's in Lucerne, which solemnly exhorted the governments of Europe to "gain the friendship and the trust of the enslaved nations and not of the tyrants in the Kremlin" and not to relax in their vigilance against Communist infiltration. But the Old and the New Liberals part company in these respects:

a. The Neo-Liberals insist on a free market economy, but they are convinced that "colossalism" is an evil: it tends to destroy true competition which is necessary for a progressive industry and for the freedom of the consumer who must have a real choice. They are opposed to trusts and cartels, rationing, price-fixing, and prohibitive currency regulations. They want neither the rule of "big industry" nor of the trade unions.

b. They insist emphatically that everybody be given a chance to build up capital. "Capitalism for *everybody*" is their slogan. In this sense they are "distributionists."

c. Their belief in democracy is relative. They know from experience that the masses are capable of voting away their freedom. They share with the original liberals the fear of an "absolute democracy."

d. They believe in "federalism" which, in Europe, means decentralization (emphasis on local rights, state rights, etc.). They insist that nothing should be carried out by a larger political unit if it can effectively be handled on a lower level or in a smaller geographic division.

e. They are convinced (in varying degrees) that the ethics of freedom can only be derived from the religious values embedded in the Judaeo-Christian tradition. They have given up the mere thought of an anti-Catholic attitude. And, naturally, there are now many Catholics (as well as Protestants) active in the Neo-Liberal movement.

Some of the Neo-Liberals are not too happy about the label of "liberalism" because of its negative historical and anti-theological connotations. One of their leading minds, Professor Wilhelm Roepke in Geneva, prefers the term "Decentralism." Others talk of "Ordo-Liberalism" rather than Neo-Liberalism. Dr. Alexander Ruestow, Professor Emeritus at Heidelberg, "father of Neo-Liberalism," remains faithful to this term. This outstanding specialist in classic philosophy and economics is a link to the older liberalism (which he emphatically rejects).

Most but not all leading Neo-Liberals are Germans (or ex-Germans) and Austrians. Indeed, behind Germany's miraculous reconstruction lies Neo-Liberal economics. The Neo-Liberals are not a mass movement and not a party. Their popular echo is almost nil. But they are right. And they have repaired the totally shattered economy of a people of fifty million almost over night. Which is more than socialism has achieved anywhere, at any time.

Principles and Heresies

FRANK S. MEYER

Politics and Responsibility

Political men in a representative republic have always had to consider the opinions of their constituencies. And sometimes the sheer love of power has led them to an extreme pampering of the whims of those constituencies against the dictates of morality and their own better judgment. But, by and large, until recent times it was thought the duty of those elevated to positions of legislation and administration to act as a "creative minority," to guide and educate the opinion upon which they were dependent. Thus, the appeal to the electorate was, on large issues at least, an appeal to choice on the level of principle.

It would be idle to idealize the past or to deny that, even at the best, principle in politics has always been mixed with a large element of interest and advantage, that it has always been more or less heavily larded with pork from the barrel. But it has been left to our enlightened time to make a virtue of opportunism, to deny the very place of principle in politics, to make of sensitive and immediate reaction to the mood of the voter, skillful interpretation of public-opinion polls, the highest quality of the rising public man.

The result is that political decisions which are fraught with moral implications of the most far-reaching significance are, in every Western country, taken on the grounds of the sheerest expediency, to satisfy the appetites or satiate the thoughtless passions of whatever collections of voters are believed powerful enough to affect an election.

It is this kind of "leadership" which, at its extreme, has been one of the major factors in creating the French political imbroglio, from which Americans and Englishmen are accustomed to extract so satisfactory a sense of political superiority. But any serious consideration of the content of the rivalry between the Conservative and Labor parties in Britain at the present time, or between the Republican and Democratic parties here, will quickly remove the grounds of self-satisfaction. That we are in better case than the French would seem to be due to the survival, though in a battered state, of institutions we owe to the wisdom of our ancestors; to the fact that we have not as yet exhausted the moral capital bequeathed us by past generations; but not to any profound differences in the caliber of our present political leadership.

As the London *Spectator* said recently, remarking upon an editorial in the *Daily Telegraph* that posited public opinion as a sovereign reason for political action on a moral question:

> The argument from public opinion has neither moral nor intellectual validity. As Burke said to the electors of Bristol, "Your representative owes you not his industry only but his judgement; and he betrays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion." Perhaps it is too much to hope that Conservatives should pay as much attention to Edmund Burke as they do to Dr. Gallup.

Nor, either on domestic or foreign issues, is the spectacle of American politics any more edifying. Samuel Lubell, who, despite his Liberal bias, is a most astute analyst of the political scene, sums the matter up with an image no less ludicrous than disgraceful:

> With both the Democrats and Republicans committed to preserving the gains of the last generation [read: collectivist developments], our parties have become, as one voter pictured them, "like two fat men in a narrow hall." They cannot squeeze past each other. Either they move in the same direction or remain stuck in unbudging deadlock. [*Commentary*, March 1956]

Those who are called to the positions of natural leadership within the constitutional structure of the Republic forfeit their role, while fearful issues of domestic and foreign policy are manipulated to secure the approval of the lowest common denominator of the electorate. In such a vacuum, it is obvious that when the raw presence of crisis penetrates to the consciousness of the people, they will look elsewhere for leadership; and there are, as the twentieth century has amply shown, totalitarian demagogues, quite outside of the traditions of the West, ready to give them leadership. What is not so obvious is this: even as things are, the attitudes and desires of "the people," to which political leadership panders, are by no means the simple views of simple people, but the creation of irresponsible elites who shape and "represent" public opinion.

Irresponsible Elites

The tremendous power of the mass-communications trades (particularly since the advent of television, but long developing in multi-million-circulation magazines and newspapers, and in radio and the movies) plays first part in the shaping, although the government departments, the trade unions, the so-called voluntary organizations interact and coordinate with the publicists proper through their own public-relations activities. And it is these latter—organizations like the League of Women Voters, the American Association for the United Nations, the various associations and leagues pretending to speak for "minority groups"—which are considered as "representing" the public opinion to which the politician defers.

I am in no way questioning the propriety of the existence of such organizations in a free society, nor the right of those who speak and write to influence opinion, to do so. What I am saying is that these groupings, as things are today, function with total irresponsibility, in that the nominal holders of power, thinking to serve public opinion, are in fact merely executing the policies of these elites, whom no one can call to account. The situation would be bad enough with such groupings exercising their power without public accountability; it is made much worse, worse to a decisive degree, by the fact that those who hold this indirect power have in their immense majority no more conscious-

sponsibility to truth and principle, which should go with power, than have the politicians themselves.

It is true, of course, that a few among them have the clear and distinct aims of the Communist conspiracy. A good many more hold on principle to the objectives of a Fabian socialism. In the inchoate atmosphere of principle-less opportunism, both of these groups, by default of opposition, exert an influence far beyond their numbers and give a sinister direction to the formation of opinion and policy. But the great majority of those who compose the determining elites believe in nothing and have no conscious direction—except the fashions accepted by their fellows, the overriding need to be in the intellectual swim, in a word, conformity each with each. As our political leadership looks to what it fatuously conceives to be the will of the people to know what it should do, so those who make that opinion look to each other.

Neither Hot nor Cold

Yet for all the danger they pose to the Republic, indeed to civilization itself, these are not evil men—neither the real nor the nominal holders of power. Although—to borrow from another context the apt phrasing of William F. Buckley, Jr.—there is in their pronouncements "not a word said, not an inflection intentionally turned loose, having to do with the political or social or philosophical imperatives" that might for good or ill denote and define something to stand for or to fight against. They are, by and large, not "traitors, or adventurers, or charisma-conscious political evangelists or, even, cynics." They are neither hot nor cold. And they cannot be responsible because no one has ever taught them to see the difference between good and evil, to define and to differentiate, to know a hawk from a handsaw. It is not possible to be responsible without the ability to define and separate good and duty from interest and passion. And the teaching which has molded the outlook of the past two generations has been such that these necessary foundations for responsible leadership have on the whole simply not been available to those in power.

It is those who deal with fundamental ideas, with philosophy and theology (or, in our day, anti-theology) who in the end shape the way in which men live. The politically powerful, while they may be held accountable for the goodness or maliciousness of their will, for their personal character, are not accountable for the limitations of their training, for the intellectual atmosphere of society. Neither the discipline of definition and differentiation nor the very existence of values, of standards by which action can be judged, has been taught them. Reason has been subordinated to the flow of experience; distinction and differentiation mocked at as pedantic medievalism; and values reduced to the taste and choice of each man's natural and untutored desires. And for this state of affairs the blame rests upon the intellectuals, upon those who taught them and who taught their teachers.

Dead Center

The political life of our time reflects the intellectual trend of decades, of a successively more radical devaluation of values, culminating in a positivism, a pragmatism, an instrumentalism which have spawned the shapeless motivations of the practical man. Even these philosophical positions, however, while they were the culmination of a process of attack upon the traditional foundations of knowledge and understanding, carried with them in their very negativity certain intellectual demands that could stimulate the mind. Today, however, if a perusal of the learned journals is any indication, a dead level of mediocrity where nothing is different from anything else, a sort of intellectual entropy, rules. As a conservato-liberal and libero-conservative mishmash pervades our political life and the vast majority of the "middle-brow" "organs of opinion"—the programs of Ed Murrow, the *Time's* and *Life's*, the *Reporter's*—so the outstanding characteristic of the "highbrow" organs is vapidity.

An important philosophical journal prints as its leading article an essay entitled "Against Wisdom" — and means it. (*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, September 1955) In Milan there assemble 150 intellectuals, the most touted carriers of the ideology of the non-Soviet world, called together by the Congress for Cultural Freedom to discuss "The Future of Freedom." And what, to judge from the public reports, was their consensus? I quote from an article of Edward Shils in *Encounter* (November 1955). (He is not the most detached of witnesses, but nothing else I have read, either in reportage of the Congress or in published papers there delivered, contradicts him.) The title of his report is "The End of Ideology?" and by ideology, his context clearly shows that he means not the Marxist or Mannheimian concept of ideology as the rationalization of group interest, but all firm principle. The Congress showed, he believes, that "We no longer feel the need for a comprehensive explicit system of beliefs." It demonstrated the "growing hollowness of the conventional distinctions between socialism and capitalism . . . the vanity of the claims of simon-pure socialists and free-enterprise liberals," the futility of continuing "to argue along the old lines as if the crucial distinction in economic policy was between socialism and capitalism." The "belief in a higher law found no support, either."

If these, the cream of the recognized intellectuals of the day, collaborated to create such an impression, how can one blame the poor political man who takes "the voice of the people," whatever ventriloquist that voice may echo, as the only standard to which he can repair?

Our ills cannot be cured on any surface level. It is at the source of evil that evil must be fought; and that means that in the fight for truth and responsibility, the decisive front is the field of ideas. This, it might seem, is a sorry hope when one surveys the condition of contemporary intellectual life. But its very vapidity creates an opportunity.

The one thing that men at their best cannot tolerate is nothingness, and that is what the thinking of the accepted intellectuals of the West has reduced itself to. A false philosophy, coming at last to the dead center of its own mediocrity, can not long continue to give form to men's ideas.

The field is open, and the hope for the future lies with those who, caring deeply for truth and unable to face the emptiness of accepted thought, stand forth to revindicate value. So doing, they can make possible the rebirth of an individual, a social, a political life founded upon value.

From the Academy

RUSSELL KIRK

Liberal Learning at Wesleyan

Wesleyan University, at Middletown, Connecticut, was founded a century and a quarter ago; and it has been a good institution ever since. What is more, it is one of the few colleges (for it is primarily a liberal-arts college, plus a small graduate school) which actually have improved in standards in recent years. The president, Dr. Victor L. Butterfield, issued a very interesting annual report late last year. "Lip service to the contrary," President Butterfield writes, "many colleges are failing to take this need for quality seriously." Wesleyan is not failing.

A frequent apology from colleges which have undeniably lowered their standards since 1940 is that they are compelled to take such students as they can get, and as many as they can get, in order to keep their doors open at all in these inflationary times. Wesleyan's experience has been quite the contrary. Deliberate efforts have been made there, for several years, to increase the level of students' performance; and, far from deterring prospective undergraduates, Wesleyan (which keeps its total enrollment at 750) now has to reject more than four out of every five applicants. Before 1940, Wesleyan had about 400 applications for admission annually; now it has some 1,200. And the academic quality of those accepted has demonstrably improved. During 1955, most colleges had only a slight increase in applications for admission, if any; Wesleyan experienced an increase of 23 per cent. (These figures apply to liberal-arts colleges, not to the great state universities and colleges, with their competitive recruiting-campaigns.) A good college can still defy the tide of educational leveling.

"We have persisted in keeping Wesleyan small," President Butterfield says. "It should remain small, and I think it will." For Wesleyan remains on a truly human scale, dedicated to the enduring traditions of liberal learning. "The purpose of liberal education," Mr. Butterfield continues, "is to produce free men, free not only through release from ignorance, prejudice and provincialism, but free also in the sense of knowing and therefore of being better able to choose and accomplish what is best for man and for society." A good many college presidents talk like this, of course; but President Butterfield knows what he is saying, and means it.

Although Wesleyan, despite its Methodist origins, is not a church-affiliated college, it retains its commitment to Christian faith—and I don't mean merely to humanitarianism. A variety of Christian sects is represented among faculty and students; about 11 per cent of both faculty and students are Jewish; and a good many professors and students are unaffiliated to any church. Yet Wesleyan does not hesitate to declare its Christian principles of learning: "With those who think these intellectual opportunities hardly significant because religion is essentially a matter of devotion and faith," Dr. Butterfield observes, "I can only vigorously disagree. Faith and devotion w i t h o u t understanding are blind. . . . To discount knowledge and the intellecct in this area is a great psychological and moral, and therefore educational, error." And—while avoiding the cant phrases about "training for leadership" and "character building"—Wesleyan's president does not hesitate to state that helping to find intellectual and moral leaders, and choosing from among the young men who show signs of good and strong character, are an important part of a college's mission.

A college of liberal arts, Mr. Butterfield declares, "must oppose unalterably the mood of the times which distrusts knowledge and intellect as worthy in themselves." To take this stand nowadays, even at the better colleges, requires some courage. (Some of the people who cry most shrilly in alarm at "anti-intellectualism," I venture to suggest, are themselves among the real anti-intellectuals, being enemies to intellectual tradition and responsibility; but Mr. Butterfield emphatically is not among them. "More often than I like," he says candidly, "I run into complaints even among our alumni that Wesleyan is getting too intellectual, that no one but a 'budding Phi Bete' can any longer get in. This is of course not true, but it again points up a rather widespread suspicion of the intellect and the training of the mind for wisdom." Such pressures Wesleyan resists; and Wesleyan combines with high intellectual standards a respect for tradition and for manliness.

About the time I read Wesleyan's annual report, I came upon a newspaper account of an interesting affair at the University of Kentucky. Down in Lexington, a federal narcotics agent, late in February, broke up a ring of student gangsters who were engaged in peddling marijuana and barbiturates, and in carrying on organized burglaries. Ten students were arrested. The leaders of the ring had boasted that they intended to make a real career of crime, "educated well enough to stay out of trouble." Among other activities, they had robbed the coin-operated vending machines on the campus, had put explosives in several toilets in men's dormitories, and had burnt down Frazee Hall, a classroom building. The university's president took some pride in the fact that the university had dared to expose the gang, who had counted on sanctuary because the university would fear adverse publicity if they were arrested; and justly so, for I know of institutions where the administration has hushed up scandals nearly as bad.

So I think there is more than a little to be said for Wesleyan's attachment to intellectual and moral standards. We certainly have an immense variety of educational institutions in this country of ours. A champion of toleration unqualified once said to Irving Babbitt, "Remember, in my Father's house are many mansions." "Yes," Babbitt replied, "but they are not all on the same floor."

ARTS and MANNERS

WILLIAM S. SCHLAMM

A Horse for a Kingdom

Sir Laurence Olivier's filmed *Richard III* is the most handsomely mounted documentary I have seen since the Coronation of Queen Elizabeth. If, on the whole, I prefer that TV production of several years ago to Sir Laurence's laudable effort to sell Shakespeare to the masses, I am admittedly applying a special theory of esthetics; and it had better be explained before I return to the film.

In its most advanced forms of film and TV, photography has pushed all other visual arts toward a profound crisis. Though I am second to none in an angry distress over the state of modern painting, I am even more impatient with those who assure me that their seven-year-old children can draw better than Picasso. True, it was the exasperating arrogance of the *avant garde* that finally produced the ornery arrogance of the Philistines; but arrogance it is, and ornery, and quite stupid to boot. For the point, obviously, is not that Picasso cannot draw; the point is clearly that he can draw masterfully—and *doesn't*. And he doesn't for many reasons, quite a few of which are indeed exasperating. But one reason is objectively forceful and esthetically altogether valid: since the new invention of photography has enabled man to record his natural and social environment most competently with a machine, the painter can no longer consider this recording a pertinent or even permissible concern of his. In this respect, the contemporary painter's ambition has *of necessity* been reduced or expanded (depending on one's private esthetics).

And the fateful influence of our competent photographic gadgetry is by no means confined to painting. On the film and television screen, the breath-taking triumph of authenticity has turned the age-old conflict between realism and imagery into an immediate and desperate problem of *every* art form. The incredible familiarity of contemporary common man with the common three dimensions drives the poet, and the composer, and the sculptor, and the novelist, into the most incredible affairs with the fourth and fifth dimensions. The results are mostly distressing and I, as I said before, am second to none in getting angry at the paucity of the modern arts. But, as it behooves a conservative, I am permitting my sense of history to consider the time and the place and the social scenery. And on that contemporary scene, perhaps for the first time, and certainly with unprecedented power, looms a stupendous gadgetry—the camera, for instance.

Now my only contact with Sir Laurence Olivier is that of a paying customer; and I have therefore no direct knowledge whether he has ever paid any attention to those profound and disturbing interrelations between photography and art. But judging by his filmed product—*Richard III* for instance—he seems to be as innocently unaware of the pitfalls as Hollywood's famously uneducated producers. When Sir Laurence films Shakespeare, he makes it indeed a supercolossal production—the most colossal production, in fact, since *Quo Vadis*. The blood that is so generously shed throughout *Richard III* is the reddest red Technicolor can supply; Richard's deformed hand just as authentically a clinical case as on TV's *Medic;* and the horses the most perfect beasts I've seen photographed since the newsreels of the latest Kentucky Derby. If I am allowed an almost irresistible pun: Sir Laurence preferred a horse to the kingdom of Shakespearean poetry.

Can Shakespeare Be Filmed?

Yes, somehow that poetry is gone, that exuberant magic, the wonder that is Shakespeare. One sits for 160 minutes in front of the VistaVision-Technicolor screen, the eyes and mouth and ears open to a technically ravishing pageant of sensuous perfection, but the soul remains unnourished and there is no delight for the imaginative mind.

There is, on the contrary, occasionally even some offense. For example, Richard recites sonorous Shakespearean asides to the audience, telling them vaingloriously what he is going to do and what a dim view he actually takes of himself. Now when you *read* these asides, Richard (on the boundless and surrealistic stage of your own imagination) is so much more than an actor who portrays an evil man—he so clearly personifies the more-than-realistic interplay of crime *and* punishment, of tragic sin *and* tragic atonement, that you joyfully cooperate with the unreality of these asides. Even when acted on the stage (which in its very limitations of props and depth and width retains the essential atmosphere of unreality) these asides evoke in the audience a happy sense of secret participation, of a satisfying conspiracy with the author. But they can do no such thing in a film which, in every other respect, pretends to be as realistic as the forthcoming TV coverage of Grace Kelly's royal wedding.

It is, in short, altogether dubious whether Shakespeare ought to be filmed. And I, for one, am not impressed by the argument that it is better for the masses to see Sir Laurence Olivier emote as Richard than to inhale a Mickey Spillane. There is but a meager chance that devotees of mayhem will be reformed, if only esthetically, by witnessing sadistic deeds in plush historic circumstances (slightly obfuscated by Elizabethan language). But there is, on the other hand, the considerable danger that sensitive young people, introduced to Shakespeare via VistaVision, might forever miss the point. Shakespeare, I contend, has to be read amidst the vista and the vision of inviolable privacy, the glowing cheeks in clammy hands, the mind aflame and the imagination on a glorious rampage.

Shakespeare, if at all, must be filmed with sovereign disregard for the "realism" of the plot. In which case, admittedly, Shakespeare would prove to be a less competent scenario writer than Mr. Ben Hecht, though perhaps a greater poet. As it is, I can wholeheartedly recommend *Richard III* to anyone who likes to look at pretty pictures, stunning props and handsome horses.

BOOKS IN REVIEW

MacArthur: A Definitive Statement

CHARLES A. WILLOUGHBY

In the preface to his book, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History,* (547 pp., Alfred A. Knopf, $6.75) Major General Courtney Whitney uses a quotation from John Ruskin: "The only history worth reading is that written at the time, seen and heard, out of the mouths of men who did and saw." Trained lawyer that he is, Whitney might have added that it is also an ancient jurisprudential principle to admit no hearsay evidence but only direct witness. From the viewpoint of orthodox historical research, the "appraisal quality" of documents depends almost entirely on the official situation of the writer.

Whitney's book, a complete rebuttal of the growing collection of anti-MacArthuriana, falls into the impeccable category of historiography by Caulaincourt or de Bourienne or Lewis and Clark. The intrinsic value of these works lies in the eyewitness opportunities of the authors. However, Whitney does not stand alone; his position is strengthened and confirmed by a series of other eyewitnesses' reports (although he may well become the final figure, and his the final statement).

MacArthur in the Pacific (in the period 1941-1951, from Corregidor to Melbourne and back again) is now covered by a series of "participant" reports, viz: Report of the Sixth Army, by General Walter Krueger; Report of the Eighth Army, by General E. Eichelberger; General Headquarters Staff, by General C. A. Willoughby; The Commander-in-Chief, by General C. Whitney.

These men were paramount in their spheres, like Krueger and Eichelberger who fought the war in the final analysis. While their reports overlap and duplicate, here and there, they also dovetail and complement each other. Similarities are inescapable because these men operated on common ground; indeed, they had access, in at least fragmentary form, to a basic historical documentation of such general validity that it was finally absorbed by the War Department.

Whitney, of course, had available to him a set of the entire documentation now in MacArthur's possession, plus additional or supplementary material of a personal character. The basic documentation intrigued the press because a pseudo-liberal magazine had labeled it "MacArthur's Mystery History." There was a studied innuendo on "forty-two lockers." (Which happened to be true, since they represented just so many physical containers for a mass of wartime documents and supporting papers; whereas the actual manuscript of "Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific" required only 462 pages and 134 illustrations.)

All major military headquarters, in World War Two, maintained small research groups to prepare histories of the commands. Tokyo was no exception. The material was eventually to be used by the commanders, for their own memoirs or reports, as in the case of Eisenhower and Mark Clark. MacArthur never got around to doing his; the Korean interlude absorbed whatever leisure he might have had. He eventually turned over his material to the historians of the Department of the Army who promptly commented: "All of the material constitutes a unique and extremely valuable body of records which derives its value as much from the organization and assembly as from its contents. Tremendous effort was expended in the creation of this collection, in order to facilitate research and reference into the history of the war in the Pacific. . . ." One of two complete sets remained in MacArthur's office, for such use as he or his assistants desired. In addition, General MacArthur made available personal records (though "briefs" of principal radio messages, estimates, directives, orders, etc. were also contained in the basic history).

It is thus evident that Whitney's documentation is unimpeachable. Moreover, he complements other eyewitnesses by a more detailed delineation of the political factors which affected this war to an exceptional degree—a coalition of nations and peoples that had very little in common, except an enemy, and whose political and economic motivations were chauvinistic and often alien to American interests and tradition.

Whitney's book is particularly illuminating in respect to these international elements. The third major subdivision of his story deals with the North Korean and the Chinese Communist war. The percentages of pages allotted to various phases of the entire story are a clear index of correct emphasis. Whitney gives approximately 38 per cent of page contents to the entire war period, covering about four years, but requires 30 per cent of page contents for less than one year of the Korean war—June 1950-April 1951.

These percentages correspond to the disastrous impact of United Nations control on military operations; and to the momentousness of the cumulative maneuvers, internal and external, which emasculated the American effort and paved the way for the dismissal of the American commander. The Korean chapter has increased significance because of the coincidence (or perhaps calculated timing) of Presi-

Maj. Gen. Willoughby served as MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence from 1939 to 1951. His book, MacArthur 1941-1951, *was published in 1954.*

dent Truman's *Memoirs* and the devastating journalistic collision between MacArthur and Truman in *Life*. (Except for certain statements and summations during the congressional hearings, the *Life* piece is one of the very few definitive résumés the General has personally given since his retirement.) The broad trend of MacArthur's strategic concept is recognizable in Whitney's chapters, "In Retrospect" and "Valedictory to the Battlefield." They represent a historical mosaic with an unmistakable pattern:

"Those who bore the ultimate responsibility for American military policy could not have served the enemy cause better than through the implementation of passive defense [in Korea]. . . ."

"It screened from our counter attack or aerial observation the enemy's maneuver in support of his peninsular campaign."

"It denied us reinforcement of trained Chinese troops standing by on the Island of Formosa while employing our Seventh Fleet to deny those troops to make diversionary attacks on the Chinese mainland."

"It denied us the right to blockade Red China against the importation of supplies."

"It refused the employment of our naval and air striking power against the Red Chinese arsenals and industries."

"The cumulative effect of these limitations was to relegate our ground forces to a costly, unproductive, bloody and stalemated war of attrition."

"At the Soviet's behest, we entered into protracted truce negotiations with the enemy, during which we sustained more casualties than during the previous period of bitter combat."

"MacArthur estimated that he could have won the war with China with half that loss had his advice been accepted."

"The truce talks permitted the Red Chinese to build up their air power and shift men and supplies for the reduction of Indo-China. When MacArthur heard of the signing of the Korean armistice, he said: 'This is the death warrant for Indo-China. In war, a great nation which does not win, must accept all the consequences of defeat.' "

Whitney quotes General Carl Spaatz, former Chief of Staff of the Air Force: "Korea could have been the right war in the right place. Our best opportunity to stop the spread of Communism in Asia was when the Chinese crossed the Yalu. This was clearly an act of aggression. History will record the tragic consequences of the United Nations failure to fight Mao. When the fighting stopped, the Chinese Army had been badly mauled but the real set-back to the Communists ended in the gratuitous release of Chinese forces and the supplies for the fight in Indo-China."

Whitney feels that those elements of the press which tended to support Truman are now taking a second look at their position. The Alsops, lusty critics of MacArthur, have had the courage to reverse their judgment.

"The Indo-Chinese crisis," says Whitney, "vindicates the judgment of MacArthur. If MacArthur had won his fight against the artificial limits of the Korean war, the free world would not now be menaced with catastrophe in Asia. . . . MacArthur was right in three different ways. He was right in proclaiming that there was no 'substitute for victory.' He was right that the Korean war was a crucial test to win. The Chinese intervention in Korea was the right time for a showdown in the world struggle between the Soviet and the free world. In simplest terms: in 1950-51 the United States already possessed decisive air-atomic striking power, while the Soviet's was still virtually nil. The Communist enemy had then proved his aggressive intentions. Our one major weapon then had its fullest value."

At this late date, one metropolitan reporter with easy access to the Pentagon has this to say: "The J.C.S. (Radford) are persuaded that the Korean war should have been fought to a real decision. The war which General Bradley described as the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time was in fact the best possible place to challenge Communist power without the risk of a general war. For Russia to support China in a war without artificial restraints imposed on the U.S. would have put an impossible strain on the Trans-Siberian railroad. Korea offered the U.S. a chance to engage the highest forms of Soviet airpower on most advantageous terms, in a war of attrition which might well have destroyed the Mao regime and shaken the power and prestige of the Soviet Union."

Now as in the past, the Communists are winning because they possess superior political will and strategic intelligence. The basic question is not who is ahead in terms of bombers, missiles, A and H bombs. We were ahead in 1950 and it made no difference. "You cannot win without the will to win." This was the appraisal in MacArthur's Headquarters in 1950. It is also the only correct appraisal in 1956.

Notes on a Good Example

Higher Learning in Britain, by George K. Kneller. 301 pp. Berkeley, Cal.: The University of California Press. $6.00

Even though he labors under the handicap of being an associate professor of education (at UCLA), Dr. Kneller writes competently, and is a good scholar. This is a valuable book, devoted principally to a discussion of the controversies over the ends and means of university education now in progress in England. (The title is somewhat misleading, for there are very few references to Scottish and Irish universities.) Anyone who reads it will perceive that the whole discussion of higher education is being carried on there at a level much above that of the similar debate in America; and that if we are to get anywhere in our argument, we shall have to penetrate to the heart of the matter, as the English scholars are doing.

The chapters on "Moral Man and Social Values" and "Education for Democratic Leadership" are particularly enlightening. The role of religious and ethical knowledge in higher education, and the function of the university in developing that aristocracy of mind and spirit without which no nation can long endure, are being examined by Michael Oakeshott, Sir Walter Moberley, Arnold Nash, F. R. Leavis, Bonamy Dobrée, Eric James, and others with a high seriousness. Mr. Kneller presents their several cases succinctly and fairly.

Professor Kneller's private opinions, however, are somewhat disappointing, particularly because one suspects that he is quite capable of rising well above the general level of cant and slogan in which our American discussion of education generally is enveloped. Now and then he falls into the American Ph.D.'s or D. Ed.'s unfortunate trick of Jovian omniscience in his commentary: "Surely the spirit of learning of the modern university and the character of the contemporary student are not expected to be modeled after a personality of the temperament and ideology of Thomas Arnold." I suspect that Mr. Kneller has read Lytton Strachey on Dr. Arnold, and not much else. And there are some of the glib false generalizations (fortunately, not very many of them) of the educationist, like the notion that "in medieval England they [teachers] occupied a position about equal to that of a stable boy."

In the concluding chapter, a muddy and vitiating relativism is discernable: "Such controversies as rage today on the feasibility of coeducation or sex education or moral training are largely sectarian or mythological in their origin, not biological or psychological, and not at issue in other quarters. At heart such problems should be equally sociological in their resolution. Western civilization, we must remind ourselves, owes its cultural prowess and its intellectual triumphs to its obdurate, persistent habit of challenging and experimenting with taboos." Etc., etc. Even Dr. Kneller's prose suffers when he slips into this cant of the Deweyite orthodoxy. RUSSELL KIRK

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Bold Yea-Saying

Glenport, Illinois, by Paul Darcy Boles. 424 pp. New York: Macmillan Company. $4.50

Perhaps the best service that a reviewer of *Glenport, Illinois* can do its possible purchasers is to warn them of what they will *not* find in it. They will not find crime, alcoholism, drug addiction, juvenile delinquency, political corruption, homosexuality, Communism, Fascism, psychoanalysis, pleas for academic freedom or loyalty hearings. They will not find more than a modicum of sex, and that treated without prurience or clinical detail, or more than a mere shadow of racial prejudice, and that projected lightly across the fringes of the narrative. In short, readers of *Glenport, Illinois* will be sorely disappointed if they come to it looking for a fashionable novel.

Indeed, Mr. Boles is so unfashionable that he writes of American life, not as one who feels a sense of intellectual alienation from it, but as one whose roots are deep in the soil of his country, and as one who draws strength and happiness from that soil. He is unfashionable enough to believe that the American dream, far from being dead or discredited, is still a living, invigorating force. He is unfashionable enough—in an age when so many novelists are inspired by the spirit that denies—to be, through the mouths of his characters, a bold Yea-sayer. He is unfashionable enough to celebrate the wonder of daily living, the mere facts of the workaday world; unfashionable enough to dwell on what Lewis Mumford, writing of Renoir in a passage recently quoted by John Chamberlain, has called the "relaxed, sunlit moments whose immediate reward is grace, laughter, ecstasy, and animal health."

Glenport, Illinois is the story of a small Midwestern town and its people. At the center of the narrative is Tone Grayleaf, who is eleven years old when the novel opens in 1929, and who has said goodbye forever to Glenport when the novel ends at a date that is identified only as "yesterday." The reader shares the growing pains of Tone and his friends, and of the town itself; but the pains seem negligible when compared to the spirit of vital joy that pervades the story as a whole.

Mr. Boles creates an illusion of reality by employing a remarkable density of detail, by lavishing time and words on the minutiae of ordinary existence. For example, he takes two pages to narrate the raising of a shop's awning, seven lines to turn an automobile around, eleven lines to describe a tweed jacket. Yet this accumulation never becomes wearisome, and, although he is for the most part as factual as Defoe, he can rise without effort from the plane of factuality to that of poetry. He can sing as well as speak.

There are minor flaws in *Glenport, Illinois*. The working hours kept by Tone's father do not seem to be those that are kept by small-town bakers; it is unlikely that the senior Grayleafs and Foxes would have called each other by their first names at first meeting; and it is nearly incredible that a fifteen-year-old boy should be permitted to adorn a United States Post Office with murals. But, whatever holes we may pick in this novel, we must respect the sincerity, honest workmanship and skill that have gone into its making; and if some readers value its message so highly that they are led to rate it above its true worth as literature, I for one shall not be severe with them. BEN RAY REDMAN

Seven at a Blow

Government by Committee, by K. C. Wheare. 264 pp. New York: Oxford University Press. $4.00

In a moment of exasperation during the war, Mr. Churchill described the British Government as "overrun by committees, as the Australians were by rabbits." But the committees have continued to multiply both in Britain and in America.

An eminent Oxford political scientist seeks in this book to show both the importance and the manner of operation of committees in modern British Government. An avowed "inveterate committee man" himself, Professor Wheare finds committees being used in Britain for six different purposes: to advise, to inquire, to negotiate, to legislate, to administer, and to scrutinize and control. Sometimes they perform more than one of these functions and occasionally they seem to perform none at all. But this

classification, enlightening in itself, serves the author as a framework in which to organize his book. He thus deals with committees according to what they do rather than according to who appoints them or where they are found. The result is sometimes confusing to the reader, who must follow him in a quick leap from a local government committee to a Royal Commission. But doubtless a different method would have produced similar difficulties, and this one has the advantage of emphasizing the job the committees are doing. The virtue of a plan often becomes the measure of its own faults.

The book employs another important analytical tool as well. Mr. Wheare has identified seven functions performed by persons in and around government committees, or as he puts it, "seven characters in committee work": the chairman, the secretary, the official, the expert, the layman, the party man and the interested party. Most committees, whatever they do, find a need and a place for each of these, though one man may, of course, combine in himself more than one function. By identifying his characters and assessing their work and importance in each of his six kinds of committees, Mr. Wheare covers his topic with a kind of methodological cross-hatching. He displays great perceptiveness at every point, and conveys a clear understanding of a complex development in modern government.

One word of warning: the book deals not with committees in general but with governmental committees and, apart from a side glance or two at French or American practice, it deals strictly with committee work in the British system. Though it can be read with profit by anyone interested in public affairs, its greatest appeal will be to specialists in comparative government or legislative processes. Some day its effect may be more widely felt, for it deals with a subject heretofore largely unexplored and one that will repay more careful study in this country. Quite properly the author is cautious and his judgments tentative; the book is not likely to cause much controversy. Aware of the broad scope of his inquiry and the lack of detailed preliminary studies, Mr. Wheare offers his work with an amiable modesty; in it, he says, he is "attempting to fly before he can walk."

Indeed the principal effect of the book lies not so much in the significance of its conclusions as in the cumulative impression it leaves of the amazing extent to which the British have resorted to committees of all sorts in governing themselves. At every level and for nearly all purposes, committees have increasingly been found both useful and necessary. Perhaps only thus can an operation so vast as a modern government be carried on, but exasperation and a diffusion of responsibility are bound to follow. No doubt Mr. Churchill had reason to complain; the British have as much reason to worry about their committees as the Australians have to worry about their rabbits. WILLIAM S. LIVINGSTON

Part Supernatural

Trailing the Cowboy, by Clifford P. Westermeier. 414 pp. Idaho: The Caxton Printers. $5.00

The American Cowboy—The Myth and the Reality, by Joe B. Frantz and Julian Ernest Choate, Jr. 232 pp. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press. $3.75

These two books were not published for the regular "Westerns" market, or as "Western Americana" either. They seem, rather, to have been written for Ph.D. committees in graduate schools. Which is to say that college teachers, strange as this may seem to our most genuine and tireless cowboy addicts, are now *studying* cowboys.

Both books, accordingly, skip live cowboys to get at those more suitable for practical research projects. The pure, authentic form of cowboy, it seems, had a "short, but definite, life span, covering principally the years 1867 to 1885." In 1867 Texas longhorns were first trailed to the new railhead at Abilene for shipment to Chicago. And, beginning then, the Texans, driving their open range cattle to the railroads and on up the Great Plains into the vast short grass country of the federal domain reaching to the Rockies, created the archetypes of the American cowboy.

They lasted until 1879, when "one hundred thousand Texas longhorns were trailed into Montana," which was to be the end of the trail. The cowboy pattern shifted from the classic type of the long trail drive toward a new hero of pioneer ranching in the open, public range. The scramble to cash in on open range ranching "took place mainly between 1879 and 1885, less than a third of the time occupied by the trailing chapter."

Then, suddenly, it was all over. Barbed wire came West on railroads. The public domain was parcelled out. Immigrants raised sheep and planted crops. Even the weather conspired against the big-time, loosely operated pioneer ranches. "By 1892, the story of the frontier ranch and its cowboys had already been lived."

Trailing the Cowboy purports to discover, through contemporary newspaper reports, the actual character of those cowboys who rode the West from the Civil War to 1890. The files of the period are ransacked for descriptions and news reports. The preface boasts that "very little editing occurs therein. . . . No attempt has been made to question, explain, or correct these impressions or opinions, for, essentially, they are balanced by innumerable sound and reliable observations."

The resulting picture is not much clearer than an old-fashioned, silent Western movie. The judgment of the original journalists and observers cited conflicts on nearly all disputed points, such as the criminal tendencies of the cowboys, their normal effects on a local town when they hit it, the proportion of brutality in their make-up, and the extent to which they possessed the contemplative virtues. No one can say that too few frontier resources have been harvested. But those that have been do not receive any artistic or philosophic emphasis. The fodder is uncured.

It is harder to assess the larger and more highly worked material in *The American Cowboy*. The presentation and packaging seem to advertise some kind of new, grown-up purpose, and the authors almost claim a theme or insight that might place their work apart and above the common run of cowboy literature. Much of the book is at least interesting. The authors furnish historical observa-

tions about such matters as the meat industry, the filling of the West, and the development of government from raw wilderness. Such observations, however, are made by the way, and on the main theme—cowboys—the authors are careful to the point of being uninspiring.

Their main line on the cowboy seems to be that he was a workingman. In short, a cowboy was a cowboy: first and classically a Texas trail driver, and then gradually a "line rider" for a range ranch; always a roundup puncher. The authors contradict themselves about the historical years of the cowboy; at various times, on special occasions, they allow him a contemporary existence, but generally keep him within the academic professional limits of 1867-1885.

Messrs. Frantz and Choate are especially concerned with the "myth" of the cowboy, which they undertake to isolate both in literature (if we may speak loosely) and in history. Despite their formidable twenty-page bibliography, however, and the genuine confidence that their easy knowledgeability engenders, the reader is disappointed in this major part of the book. And for two important reasons.

They seem to question almost all the standard characteristics of the typical story-book and television cowboy. Their method is to deny the universal possession by cowboys of the traits given the ones celebrated in normal production. But while examining the records and demonstrating that the heroes and villains were not universal or even typical varieties of real cowboys, they nevertheless almost invariably show that some particular, real cowboys *were* as naive Americans always believed them to be. It simply can't be denied, it seems, that *some* cowboys did indeed sing off-key to the herds at night, carry guns, fight Indians, save women and children, hate sheep, get drunk, and ride a horse very, very well. This, most of us knew.

The problem of "myth," in general, grows more and more troublesome in reading and writing circles. When myths are talked about, the audience may well fear to be kidnapped and carried off into an infidel system of comparative religion, or a semi-reformed clinic of distasteful psychoanalysis, or a subversive political party dedicated to spitting on the flag. The authors of these volumes threaten nothing like that. They write a lot about "the myth of the cowboy," but they refrain from defining what they mean. From internal evidence, one gathers that they simply misuse the word.

The first meaning given by Funk & Wagnalls is: "A fictitious or conjectural narrative presented as historical, but without any basis of fact." These studies, however, provide plenty of basis of fact, and, come to think of it, the romances of Zane Grey and the Lone Ranger and their colleagues were never presented as historical fact to begin with. A loftier definition is "the creation of a fact out of an idea." "Fact" here is certainly a loaded word, but these books neither seek the myth-making idea, nor describe the fact the myth has made.

The closest our two books come to dealing with a dictionary-type "myth" follows from Funk & Wagnalls' Number 2 definition: "A traditional story told about supernatural beings or the supernatural actions of animate beings or inanimate objects. . . ." The American cowboy and his exploits and his country were, naturally, part supernatural. But that, again, we knew. PHILIP BURNHAM

Old Story, New Scare

The Flying Saucer Conspiracy, by Major Donald E. Keyhoe. 315 pp. New York: Henry Holt and Company. $3.50

For more than two thousand years men have occasionally seen luminous objects of unknown origin moving through the lower atmosphere. According to this diffuse and repetitious book, such phenomena are now observed many times each day, and a considerable number of military airplanes have disappeared or crashed while in pursuit of them. Unnamed officers in the Air Force not only suppress most of the reports, but concoct false or misleading statements to the press designed to discredit Major Keyhoe and others who believe that the objects are machines operated by Martians or Selenians. If this is true, the men from Mars are less dangerous than the men in the Pentagon. R.P.O.

Friend of Congress

Congress: Its Contemporary Role, by Ernest S. Griffith. Second Revised Edition. 207 pp. New York: New York University Press. $3.50

It is good that there is demand and occasion for publishing a new edition of this sound book by the Director of the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. Since 1940, Mr. Griffith has served his country well at a post which, for all its academic-seeming title, has proved a strategic key in the never ceasing struggle to shore up the constitutional bulwarks of our republic. He is a well trained and thoroughly informed scholar. He understands Congress through daily experience as well as by analytic knowledge.

This book is primarily a study of the function of Congress in the context of today's problems. Two quotations from the author's preface will suggest, for all their reserved language, how unusual is the author's standpoint:

"The favorable view of Congress held by the author goes counter to that held by a whole group of administrators and students of administration.

"The author may in many respects be more conservative than some. This reflects itself in my admiration for government by consensus as against government by majority rule; for parties that are cross sections rather than for parties on class lines; for state and local experiment and vitality rather than for great national programs." J.B.

One for the Road

The Power to Go, by Merrill Denison. 324 pp. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Company. $5.00

The use of automobiles in America began as a sport, became a delightful luxury, is now a banal necessity, and will soon be a national affliction. Mr. Denison has written a businesslike history of the industry that so abundantly satisfies our locomotive instincts. R.P.O.

To the Editor

"Mr. Eisenhower's Decision"

Your March 21 issue was the best so far. The William F. Buckley article on the Eisenhower decision and Eisenhower program is by far the best thing of its kind in print.

James Burnham's column on military power and the will to survive is superb and masterful. Your magazine is what America has long needed.

Washington, D.C. HOLMES ALEXANDER

I certainly commend your article "Mr. Eisenhower's Decision" to the public. It embodies so much of my own thoughts and feelings. Your magazine is a solid "feet-on-the-ground" one dealing with logic and realities soundly and without equivocation. . . . My gratitude for it is very great.

Canaan, Ct. LILLIAN S. MACLENNAN

Germans at Stalingrad

Congratulations to Freda Utley for her review of the collection of the letters of the last German soldiers at Stalingrad [February 29]. The invaders who ruined parts of the Russian land as big almost as the United States and killed millions of Russian men, women and children, found an unqualified sympathy and even vindication. . . . The rule of extremities in politics makes its clear appearance in NATIONAL REVIEW . . . The great Orwell did not know that rewriting of history belongs not only to habits of the Big Brother but became, somehow, a general disease!

Washington, D.C. I. BOGOLEPOV

Freda Utley's eloquent review of *Last Letters from Stalingrad* holds a lesson worth remembering. Those doomed German soldiers had "marched on command, shot on command," brought ruin and death to millions on command. And all for a cause in whose righteousness they did not believe: "My guilt is in the ratio of 1 to 70,000,000" . . . "to die for these foolish things" . . . "the madness of this war" . . . "1932 would have been the time to act."

Should not these cries of disillusion and despair remind us that indifference to the policies and conduct of those who direct, or aspire to direct, our national affairs may lead us to the same ultimate waste and frustration—when it is too late to do anything to prevent it?

New York City L. F.

Mr. Lamont's Activities

In your issue of February 22, James Burnham calls me a Popular Fronter who "kept out of sight after 1948 or 1949" but who "in the latter part of the anti-McCarthy crusade . . . began crawling back to the surface." The clear implication is that after cravenly slinking away, I climbed onto the anti-McCarthy bandwagon recently, when it was "safe" to do so.

The fact is that from 1948 to 1953 I was as militant and outspoken as ever in public support of civil liberties, American-Soviet understanding, the philosophy of naturalistic Humanism and progressive causes in general. In 1948 I backed Henry Wallace as the Presidential candidate of the Progressive Party and contributed heavily to his campaign fund. In 1949 I was a sponsor of the Cultural and Scientific Conference for World Peace held at the Hotel Waldorf Astoria—a meeting that Mr. Burnham has often denounced. In 1950 I took an active and prominent part in the Second Annual Convention of the Progressive Party and was elected treasurer of it. In 1951 I published *The Independent Mind,* a book of essays expanding on all my main political and philosophic views. In 1952 I ran for United States Senator from New York on the American Labor Party ticket and published *Soviet Civilization,* my major work on the USSR. In 1953 I debated the subject of academic freedom with Burnham himself on a national television network program and, according to objective observers, positively slaughtered him; and in the same year I defied Joseph McCarthy by refusing to answer, on the grounds of the First Amendment and the tripartite separation of powers, his questions about my beliefs and associations. For taking this position I was later indicted for contempt of Congress.

These highlights of my activities show that there is not the slightest basis for Mr. Burnham's implying that I became tired or scared, and retreated to the hills. I am engaged in an unceasing struggle against the chief political, economic and social principles which Burnham and NATIONAL REVIEW stand for. And I expect to be in there fighting as long as muddled reaction remains a menace to America and the human race.

New York City CORLISS LAMONT

(Mr. Lamont does make out a strong case for the conclusion that, though his name may for a few years have been out of newspaper prominence, his activities on behalf of policies favorable to the Soviet Union, and in defense of persons aiming to subvert our government, have never slackened. THE EDITORS)

Anti-Semitism among Poujadists

. . . The article on Poujadism [March 21] did not comment that one of its basic appeals derives from the anti-Semitism of the *petits grands hommes,* the small shopkeepers of France.

New York City SAMUEL MEYER

Traipsing Congressmen

You remember Kipling's "Pagett, M.P.," the bombastic politician who just had to go to India to Investigate Conditions but who was careful of the season he chose or the territory he visited lest his health be impaired by "'Inja's sunny clime."

Kipling . . . reminded me of our traipsing Congressmen who see the world without joining the Navy, but on the taxpayers' money. . .

LAWRENCE BENNETT

Jackson Heights, N.Y.

Corrects Mr. Jones

The issue of March 14 . . . shows some bad research in Sam Jones' column. First, as to the "search" for a Republican to oppose Senator Morse—everyone I have talked to around here for weeks has agreed that Secretary McKay would resign to make the effort to unseat Morse . . .

As to Jack Westland—he is not "of Seattle" and never has been, and I don't think he would thank you for saying he is. Jack is from Everett. Also, Seattle is not especially a Democratic stronghold. Everett is . . . and

it was indeed quite a trick for Mr. Westland to get himself elected from this district. . . .

Everett, Wash. GERARD F. WIGGINS

Pink Playwrights

William Schlamm's review of *The Ponder Heart* [March 7] puzzles me. After mentioning that the authors, Joseph Fields and Jerome Chodorov, are "fellow travelers of sorts," his column advises readers to go and see the play. . . .

According to the American Legion publication, *The Firing Line*, November 1, 1955, Jerome Chodorov . . . has been identified as a member of the Communist Party before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

I fail to see how putting money in the pockets of such individuals will aid the fight against Communism, which I am sure is one of Mr. Schlamm's objectives.

New York City JEANNE MILTON

Mr. Manly Protests

. . . Because of the high standard of most of your book criticism I'm afraid that Mr. Gerhart Niemeyer's silly treatment of my book, *The UN Record* [January 11] will be taken seriously by some of your readers. He says I have "insufficient real knowledge" of the UN. How did he acquire that knowledge? In my eight years at the UN I never heard of Mr. Niemeyer but I have no doubt that he regularly read about its proceedings in the *New York Times*.

What is needed, writes Mr. Niemeyer, is "more competent and scholarly analysis of this new gadget." The suggestion that a mere gadget deserves what Mr. Niemeyer would accept as scholarly analysis, presumably by some pretentious professor with no first-hand knowledge of the subject, is a little incongruous.

Like many other air-conditioned philosophers of fancied conservatism, Mr. Niemeyer comforts himself with the notion that the UN is a harmless and tolerable futility. Even the well-informed and sagacious John Chamberlain, another NATIONAL REVIEW writer, is similarly deluded about the UN. . . .

If the UN is a powerless talkshop how did it get us into the Korean war and how did it prevent us from winning that war . . . ? Even Hanson Baldwin, the military analyst of the *New York Times*, has acknowledged that our allies in the UN were responsible for the tragic result of the Korean war. . . .

The Communists . . . have good reason to be pleased with their success in using the UN to influence American policy and promote the Communist cause. A recent example was the communication of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and other members of the American delegation to President Eisenhower, asking the United States to assume the staggering burden of financing the economic development of about half the world. From its inception the UN . . . has labored to impose this burden on the United States. . . . Lenin wrote: "The more backward the country . . . the more difficult it is for her to pass from the old capitalist relations to socialist relations."

The Communists know exactly what they are doing in the UN. It is about time for Messrs. Niemeyer, Chamberlain and other conservatives who pronounce upon that organization to learn something about it.

Chicago, Ill. CHESLY MANLY

Prof. Niemeyer Replies

Mr. Manly complains about my "silly treatment" of his book and casts doubt upon my knowledge of United Nations affairs. He may well be justified in raising these objections.

What I said about Mr. Manly's book was that it is "more factual . . . . Drawing upon his close familiarity with UN personalities and procedures, he combines many penetrating observations into a clear picture of the UN's effectiveness and the extent to which it has been penetrated by the Left." If, on Mr. Manly's showing, that is silly, then I can only join him in inviting NATIONAL REVIEW's readers not to take my remarks seriously.

Regarding the state of my knowledge of United Nations affairs, three years of experience in the State Department in addition to many more years of study of the subject have just about convinced me that I have no real knowledge of the UN as a political institution. Nor, would I maintain, has anyone else. I am old-fashioned enough to believe that knowledge is obtained through systematic reflection on observed facts, when the mind succeeds in keeping under control the wishes and emotions that make up our subjective reactions to things. The field of international organization, including the UN, has never been approached in this way.

From the beginning of the League of Nations, this field of study has been treated—first and above all by Liberal *ideologues*—as an opportunity to indulge in a kind of secular cult. Pipe dreams were treated as if they were reality, worship at the shrine of international organization was demanded as a moral duty, the assumptions underlying both the institutions and their study were left unexamined. There is now a considerable literature on both the League of Nations and the United Nations. Nevertheless, no one knows with certainty just how much, in what way, or with what ultimate results international organizations have influenced the policies of nations. The studies simply have not raised this question. Scholars have not devoted their efforts to it.

Mr. Manly is therefore right when he questions my knowledge on this subject. I agree with him, especially since I am sure that he would not claim that merely being present at the scene of historical events would be tantamount with real knowledge.

Notre Dame, Ind. GERHART NIEMEYER

Mental Exercise: Two Views

I am a housewife, the mother of three children. I had only two years of college which were not spent in pursuit of learning but of my present husband. . . .

I do not understand your . . . brand of humor. The insertion of copious asides in parentheses irritates me no end when I am trying to collect simple facts that I can relay in my own words. . . . Why? I love you guys. Why do you cloud up the views?

Bartlesville, Okla. ANNE ADAMS

I'm still reading NATIONAL REVIEW avidly from cover to cover. I must confess that some of the items stir up muscles in my brain that I didn't even know were there, but I force myself to read even the ones I understand least. The results are gratifying, as I find that each week I understand more. Your magazine, therefore, is contributing to the non-delinquency of an adult. . . .

Valley Stream, N.Y. WILLIAM KEENE

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